The Deep problems restricting the Development of Family Farm

Through the investigation of Songjiang in Shanghai, Ningbo in Zhejiang, Wuhan in Hubei and Langxi in Anhui, and through extensive contact and discussion with farmers and grass-roots cadres, the research group has noticed that family farms are facing a lot of problems while booming. For example, the difficulty of land transfer, the difficulty of loan, the high labor cost, the low quality of farmers, the low proportion of grain production, the lack of successors in farm management, the risk of farm management and so on. Some of these problems are just appearances, and we cannot simply analyze them on a case-by-case basis. instead, we must go deep behind the problems and explore the essence of the problems. Let's try to discuss the related issues as follows:

First, an analysis of the deep-seated problems and causes restricting the development of family farms.

(1) the unclear ownership of the three "right holders" of rural land restricts the development of family farms.

Because the land of the family farm involves three "right holders", namely, the village collective (ownership), the villagers (the right of contract) and the operator (the right of management), these three "right holders" constitute the main aspects of the interests of the family farm. Therefore, if we want the healthy development of the family, we must straighten out the relationship among the three, and grasp the balance of interests of the three powers on the basis of the separation of powers. Only in this way can we clear the obstacles to the development of family farms. At present, the main effects of the entanglement of the "three rights" ownership of rural land on family farms are as follows:

First of all, the absence or offside of rural collective land ownership affects the development of family farms. At present, the performance of rural collective land ownership is not obvious in some places, which leads to the problem that the collective can not play a positive role. For example, when we were doing research in Langxi, many family farmers reflected that they needed to negotiate with farmers one by one during the transfer of land, which was time-consuming and laborious, and sometimes brought a lot of contradictions due to the lack of unified standards. Due to the lack of collective organization, no one is responsible for infrastructure construction such as irrigation facilities and road construction. Some collective organizations do nothing to protect the rights and interests of landowners, resulting in some phenomena that damage the rights and interests of landowners from time to time, such as digging fish ponds on basic farmland and building attachments on land at will. As for vigorously developing the collective economy, organizing farmers to develop modern agriculture, not to mention actively opening up the market. All these are the manifestations of the absence of collective land ownership. There are also offside problems, for example, in some suburban areas, due to the high land rent of land differential, some villages feel profitable collectively, and overemphasize the ownership of land while neglecting the land contract rights of farmers, resulting in the problem of infringing upon the legitimate rights and interests of farmers.

Second, the lack of reliable expectation of farmers' land contract rights affects the enthusiasm of farmers' long-term land transfer. In our research around the country, family farmers are generally worried that the transfer farmers are due or default to recover the land, they often have paid a lot of investment in the land, if due farmers take back the land, they will lose a lot. If they want to break their contract to resume the land, there is nothing they can do about it. There are many reasons why farmers are unwilling to sign long-term contracts: first, they are uncertain about the long-term expectation of land, worried that they will suffer losses if they sign long-term contracts due to policy reasons; second, because the rural social security system is not perfect, land has the function of social security. Third, some farmers who go out to work lack confidence in whether they can integrate into the city, so that they are unwilling to transfer land for a long time and cut off their own way.

Third, farmers' lack of expectations of land management rights encourages short-term behavior. Because of the fear of farmers taking back the land, some farmers do not dare to invest too much in the land, for example, they do not dare to buy large-scale agricultural machinery, do not dare to invest too much in greenhouses and fixed facilities, and do not want their children to follow them in farm management, and so on.

In a word, the relationship among land ownership, contract right and management right constitutes the main contradiction of family farm operation, and the key to maintain a balanced relationship among the three is to balance the interests of the three. If we overemphasize that the land contract right will remain unchanged for a long time, or further advocate the privatization of agricultural land, it will certainly lead to the rural collective economy existing in name only, the village collective unable to effectively adjust and use the land, and the difficulty of land abandonment and transfer will be difficult to solve. The development of family farms will also be limited by the lack of leading force. Although collective ownership of land is emphasized, if we do not respect the wishes of farmers, protect their interests, and force farmers to leave the land, it will inevitably lead to contradictions and difficulties in the development of family farms; similarly, if the right to the management of family farms is not effectively guaranteed, it is bound to be not conducive to stabilizing the expectations of operators, and their long-term investment and management enthusiasm will also be affected.

(2) how to properly handle the relationship between the government and the market has become a difficult problem in policy formulation in various localities.

In the four places we investigated, each has its own characteristics, and their differences are mainly reflected in the different roles of the government and the market in the development of family farms. Among the four places, the government is undoubtedly the most involved in Shanghai Songjiang; the market is the most dynamic is Ningbo. Although the strength of the government in Langxi, Anhui Province is limited, the degree of attention and the effect of guidance are very outstanding. While Wuhan, Hubei Province, whether the role of the market or the government is relatively neutral. The following takes Ningbo and Songjiang as examples to explore the role and problems of the government and the market in the development of family farms.

Generally speaking, Songjiang is a government-led model, and its advantage is that it actively guides farmers to engage in grain production through the top-level design and financial investment of the government, and has achieved good results. But there are also some problems:

First, it is difficult to sustain and replicate huge financial subsidies. In the income of family farms in Songjiang District, the government's financial subsidy accounts for 3% of it. Without government subsidies, it would be difficult for the family farm to maintain normal operation on its own profitability, and the strong investment of the government is like injecting a stimulant to maintain the vitality of the family farm. This kind of measure is necessary in the initial stage of the family farm, but it is difficult for the local finance to make a sustained large-scale investment, so one of the problems faced by the family farm in Songjiang District is how to make a profit on its own. instead of relying on government financial subsidies for a long time.

Second, the vitality of development is insufficient. It is mainly reflected in the low quality of operators and the serious aging. Young people still lack enthusiasm for managing food, and family farms without a sustained injection of new forces will be a huge problem.

Ningbo model has a very clear market orientation, farm operators have a strong market awareness, can always carry out various business around the market and the development of family farms, the farm is highly efficient and full of vitality.

However, there are also very prominent problems in the Ningbo model, which mainly shows that the profit preference of the market restricts the production of staple grain in Ningbo. The market is profit-oriented, especially for developed coastal areas such as Ningbo, family farmers generally have high expectations for profit goals, and they are generally willing to engage in the production of agricultural products with higher added value. However, they are not interested in the production of staple grains with low economic benefits. Along the way of our research, in the historical land of fish and rice like Ningbo, it is very difficult to find rice, either factories, flowers, seedlings, fruits and other cash crops.

(3) paying too much attention to family farms and other new operators may harm the interests of small farmers

At present, all localities attach great importance to large-scale operation, and some large operators are set up as models by the local government and given priority in policy; some agricultural companies are regarded as local guests after entering the countryside, however, the traditional operation of small farmers is regarded as backward and further marginalized. In this survey, we noticed the following problems:

First, individual farmers are squeezed by family farmers, leading to the emergence of new unfair phenomena in rural areas. With the development of new agricultural operators such as family farms in many areas, traditional farmers simply transfer their land to large households and give up agricultural management because they do not have the advantage of scale and poor efficiency. After transferring out of the land, many farmers go into the family farm to become employees. Some farmers simply transfer their land to large households, take a little rent and subsidies, do not engage in labor, and play mahjong all day. It is sad for farmers who have been engaged in agricultural production all their lives to give up their work and do nothing. The change of the social status of rural villagers is hardly a good thing for the social development and stability of rural areas.