"ensuring the right to contract for farmers in cities" is destroying Chinese villages.

China's marketization, urbanization and the reform of farmland system have formed a serious differentiation of farmers in various villages. At present, all kinds of farmers, as long as they do not change the household registration of their villagers, are called "farmers" or "farmers" in all kinds of documents of the central government. This rough concept is used. In fact, it is to carve the boat and ask for a sword. So that the policy is far from achieving its desired effect. It also makes more and more illicit goods in the policy. The most typical is the direct subsidy policy implemented by the government to agriculture after 2006. Originally, this kind of government subsidy should be a subsidy to the production process in order to protect the interests of farmers as producers. However, in each village, the government allocates subsidies in accordance with the contract rights certificate and transfers the subsidies directly to the accounts of the villagers of each contractor. And many farmers who go out to work do not work in agriculture. But enjoy most of this subsidy. Therefore, this kind of subsidy is actually the subsidy of "contract right".

The differentiation of farmers has formed different types of villagers. Many villagers are not necessarily farmers. But farmers must be villagers. The villagers in the village can be divided into three categories: the first is the farmers who really live and work in the village. They have 100% of the nature of farmers. The country's agricultural policy should be mainly aimed at and protect them. Instead of exploiting them and oppressing them. They are the most vulnerable groups in society. This is the first category of farmers. The second is semi-urbanized farmers. That is, the household registration is still the household registration of the villagers. But work and live in cities and towns most of the time. These villagers are the majority of the villagers. They are the second kind of villagers. The third part is the farmers who have been or basically urbanized. These farmers have changed the household registration of the villagers. Work in the town and live in the town. Has been citizenized. However, it still retains the right to contract agricultural land in the village. According to the policy, it is impossible for the village collective to withdraw and reissue the contract. This is the third category of villagers. The interests of these three types of farmers on the land are not the same. The first group of villagers are heavily dependent on agricultural land and agriculture. The second category of villagers mainly rely on part-time jobs. The third category of villagers depends on their employment situation in cities and towns. It has almost nothing to do with the identity of the villagers. But the reform has made no difference. When the government talks about "protecting the rights and interests of farmers", it is really sacrificing the interests of the first category of villagers and actually protecting the "interests" of the second and third categories of villagers. Because this is in line with the current pattern of the interests of industrialization and urbanization. In line with the current temporary and stable social needs.

Director Chen Xiwen said in an article published in People's Daily on December 8, 2015, "effectively protect the land contract rights, homestead use rights and collective income distribution rights of farmers settled in cities." it is very important to improve the enthusiasm of farmers to settle in the city, smoothly promote the reform of the household registration system, and promote the healthy development of the new type of urbanization. " Is to continue to emphasize the protection of the interests of the second and third categories of villagers. Very purposeful. But what will be the consequences of this "guarantee" for the first category of villagers who do not enter the city? Director Chen did not say. It does not mean that the serious plunder and damage caused by this consistent agricultural policy to the first category of villagers does not exist. In fact, while the top of the reform continues to emphasize the need to "stabilize the right to contract" and "guarantee the right to contract for farmers in cities", the painful situation of the first category of villagers in most villages across the country is becoming more and more serious. The poverty and pollution in most villages across the country are becoming more and more serious. There is an inevitable logical connection from the system reform to such serious consequences.

Tracing the source, the mistake of farmland reform, after the first button of abolishing the contracting right of collective economic organizations was wrong in 1984, it was basically a "path dependence" that made mistakes again and again and added to them. What Chen Xiwen said about "ensuring the contract rights of farmers in cities" is not essentially different from the previous "unchanged for 15 years", "unchanged for 30 years" and "unchanged for a long time". It's all synonymous repetition. As the interest pattern of a huge decision-making group has been formed, it is very difficult to correct this wrong path.

First of all, the reform of farmland management system began after 1979. After 1984, it gradually deviated from the right direction. This is a kind of unorganized reform direction and process. It is the result of the common uproar of policy mistakes, theoretical mistakes and public opinion mistakes. What is the right direction? No matter from Marx's political economy or the industrial organization theory of modern capitalism, organization is the only correct direction of modern industry, including agricultural development. The reason is very simple: only by organizing can Smith's division of labor and technological progress be realized. However, the organization of agriculture is not equal to enterprise and corporatization. It does not mean that we must adopt rigid collective management and collective labor. There should be a very rich way to organize. The people's commune after 1958 was correct in the general direction of organization. It also successfully realized Smith's division of labor through organization, and greatly improved agricultural productivity. Water conservancy has been basically realized in China. Its 30-year history, left behind more than 80,000 large and small reservoirs, hundreds of thousands of kilometers of irrigation channels, is an example. It is enough to show that organization is indeed a correct direction of rural development. It is an essential breakthrough in the agricultural management system. However, there are some defects in the organization or operation of the people's commune in the process of agricultural production. That is to say, most production teams basically replace the special and flexible unified operation and management needed by agriculture with enterprise management. As a result, there are incentive problems in the production process. These problems in the incentive mechanism evolved into the different performance of the production team. According to du Runsheng, Wanli and other reform authorities, there are three 1canes. The villages of 1ax 3 are doing well, the villages of 1ax 3 are generally good, and the villages of 1par 3 are bad. In the face of history, these authorities are not totally negating. This kind of incentive problem of the production team was later unanimously criticized by public opinion as "big boom", "idle work" and "blind command". This criticism of the mode of operation is partial to generalization and goes to extremes, but it is more or less reasonable, revealing the problem of the specific management system of the people's commune in the process of production, that is, in the process of agricultural production, due to the decentralized, seasonal and diversified characteristics of agriculture, the enterprise management mode can not be adopted. It should be the family way of doing business. Let agricultural labourers have greater flexibility and adaptability. If the reform is limited to the reform and adjustment of the mode of operation of the people's commune. Then the organization of China's agriculture, rural areas and farmers will not be interrupted and can continue. There will not be a growing problem of agriculture, rural areas and farmers. Unfortunately, "truth beyond one step is falsehood". The reform will raise the criticism of the mode of operation of the people's commune to the negation of the collective property rights of the people's commune and the overall negation of agricultural organization.

When the reform was just started, family management was used instead of collective labor. Some results have been achieved. First of all, this is because the people's commune at that time has basically completed the water conservancy. It raises the production curve of village agriculture. Secondly, it is because the family management is more adapted to the productivity characteristics of agriculture. Therefore, on the basis of water conservancy, it is possible to have the rapid growth of agriculture from 1979 to 1984. Lin Yifu and du Runsheng, as theorists, have seriously misled the national policy and public opinion on this issue. However, family management is not equal to small-scale peasant management. Small-scale peasant management is a kind of family management state in which the land property right is private. Is a lack of organization of the "atomized" state. It is almost impossible to generate new productivity spontaneously. The history of China for thousands of years has proved that this mode of operation of small farmers will certainly cause serious shackles and retrogression to agricultural productivity. The reason is that it completely violates the direction of industrial organization. Therefore, the mode of operation of small farmers must be an outdated and backward mode of operation. Moreover, under the condition of modern market economy, due to the intervention of modern chemical elements such as pesticides and chemical fertilizers, and in the lack of overall management of collective economic organizations, its damage to the sustainability of village agriculture is often more serious than the historical small-scale peasant economy.

Document No. 1 in 1984 transformed the family business into a small-scale peasant operation with "the right of contract shall remain unchanged for 15 years". This confusion and misunderstanding of the concept has changed the nature of China's farmland reform. Initiated the process of complete destruction of agricultural organization. The central government even severely restricted and disbanded collective economic organizations. The integrity of the village disappears. In the noisy reform field of marketization and privatization, the central government reveled in the temporary success of household management. Completely unaware of the destruction of the organization of rural areas, agriculture and farmers is a very dangerous direction. The "30 years" after 1998 and the "long-term unchanged" in 2008 basically make China's agricultural management mode fixed on the small-scale peasant management model. The "combination of unification and separation and two-tier operation" stipulated in Article 8 of the Constitution has been substantially abandoned. This is also a serious damage to the integrity of the government in the construction of China's legal system. Since the direction of China's development is to build a legal society, why can reform be lawless? Agricultural land reform is moving towards substantial privatization with a gradual strategy. This unorganized reform of the management system and the property rights system makes the countryside, agriculture and the first category of villagers more and more far away from the necessary division of labor and cooperation for development. Therefore, China's "agriculture, rural areas and farmers" have basically lost the hope of development. At the same time, this is another reason for the "tide of migrant workers". The only way for villagers to change their situation is through working and doing business. Find ways to transform themselves from the first category of villagers to the second and third category of villagers. This kind of change can partly change its income situation. However, it is very easy to cover up the difficult situation of the first category of farmers after they are disorganized in the village.

Therefore, the "tide of migrant workers" in China should not be simply misinterpreted as a kind of labor transfer or urbanization in the sense of Lewis. Behind it is the overall deterioration of the rural environment caused by the reform.

The source and two aspects of the deterioration of village environment. The first is after the agricultural organization has been destroyed. The agricultural operating costs of small farmers have risen out of thin air. For the first category of villagers, it is necessary to prepare all kinds of means of production in order to complete agricultural production, even if it is only for one season. Especially agricultural machinery and all kinds of irrigation equipment. Such as cultivated land, transportation, need tractors, pumping irrigation needs pumps. There are also rice transplanters, harvesters and so on. Without these agricultural machinery, it is very hard and inefficient to rely on manpower to engage in agricultural production. However, as fixed assets, these agricultural machinery are of great value. Its utilization is efficient only on a certain scale. In order to reduce the shared cost. For example, a production team, or a villagers' group, owns agricultural machinery such as tractors and harvesters on a scale of about 1000 mu. The utilization efficiency will be greatly improved. The average cost-sharing per mu will be greatly reduced. However, while the reform destroys the management system of the people's commune, it also completely destroys the scale of agriculture. At present, in many villages in Guangdong, this is why farmers have to rely on manual harvesting during the rice harvest season. Because the family size is too small, agricultural machinery is difficult to be economically feasible, so they can only continue to work by hand. Second, after the disappearance of labor cooperation, Smith's division of labor disappeared. The mode of operation of small-scale farmers can not produce a rich and scientific Smith division of labor. This leads to a sharp decline in the labor efficiency of the first category of villagers. Every peasant household must do all the necessary work before, during and after the production of agriculture in order to complete the whole process. For some seeds, for a bag of pesticides, for a bag of feed, he may have to ride a motorcycle to and from town, or run around the fields. "small and comprehensive" must be high labor costs, which makes it impossible for the first and second categories of villagers to work in agriculture at all. Therefore, under this "disorganized" farmland system, China's agriculture has gradually evolved into a very helpless "agriculture for the elderly". Only some of the elderly who have lost their ability to work have to work at home. Agriculture has become its dependence on avoiding the market, being self-sufficient and barely making a living.

Secondly, the disintegration of the people's commune makes the organization of the non-economic elements of each village disappear. The elements in the village are far more than productive ones. There are also many non-economic factors. Such as ecological elements, social elements, cultural elements and so on. These factors or environment also determine the quality of life of the villagers and the efficiency of agricultural production. In the modern market economy, it is impossible to rely on "governing by doing nothing". There must be an organization to supervise, organize and manage it on a daily basis. This is the key productivity basis for the "integration of politics and society" in the people's commune. In 1958, Mao Zedong promoted the establishment of the people's commune, not only in the right direction. On the contrary, it now seems to be very far-sighted. He saw the limitations of the market. Also see clearly the general direction of village governance in the future. However, after the forced disintegration of the people's commune in 1983, driven by the market-oriented reform, institutions at the township, village and group levels no longer bear the organization and management responsibilities of these non-economic elements. On the other hand, single-family farmers can not bear this kind of public management responsibility. As a result, supervision vacuum, organization vacuum and management vacuum are formed in these important fields. As a result of the complete failure of the market pricing of these non-economic factors, these elements and fields have become various "negative externalities" discharge places for villagers to pursue a single economic profit. The discharge of sewage and the disposal of garbage are becoming more and more intense under this kind of organizational vacuum. Some small chemical industry, small bleaching and dyeing, hardware, in order to escape the supervision of the city, set up factories in rural areas. As a result, the industrial sewage caused all the water systems in the nearby villages to be polluted. The villagers' basic drinking water has become a problem. Many villages that are supposed to be "small bridge and flowing water's family" and have a beautiful environment are now filthy. It even developed into a "cancer village". With the continuous deterioration of the ecological environment of the village, the basic life of the villagers has been seriously threatened as never before. The only way to escape this threat is to escape from the village.

The continuous deterioration of the environment in Chinese villages is the result of the wrong farmland reform. Therefore, in the big cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, we can often see some elderly farmers wandering and begging. In fact, they are the refugees created by the farmland reform. They have contracted land, so why should they be displaced in the city? If the decision is made according to Deng Xiaoping's standard of "productive forces", the wrong farmland reform should be reformed immediately. Instead of continuing "path dependence".

China's agriculture, rural areas and the first category of villagers have been paying a huge price for reform. How long can this price last? It's definitely impossible to hold on indefinitely. One of the important reasons is that the "household contract management" system directly and indirectly leads to the overall deterioration of the rural ecological environment, which may one day detonate a comprehensive ecological crisis and agricultural crisis covering urban and rural areas. As the rural organization is constantly destroyed by erroneous reform, each village falls into a comprehensive organization vacuum and management vacuum. Therefore, a variety of eco-environmental disasters that occur in villages, such as floods, droughts, landslides and so on, will become more and more frequent. Moreover, they will spread from the countryside to every town. Therefore, the so-called logic of "ensuring the contract rights of farmers in cities" is actually the logic of continuing to destroy Chinese villages and the integrity of Chinese agriculture. It has no intention of reflecting on the mistakes of reform. For the citizenization of 260 million category II migrant workers, the top of the reform has been emphasizing an interesting reason, that is, due to the limited economic capacity, it is impossible for cities to provide social security for all farmers. It means that farmers can go to work in cities, but it is reasonable, reasonable and understandable (or with Chinese characteristics) that citizenization cannot be done. It means that cities can share the "demographic dividend" from migrant workers, but can not bear the cost of urbanization. The "dividend" is mainly shared by the cities, but the cost has always been borne by the rural areas. It means that if the rich city cannot afford the price, it must be borne by the poor village. It is like a landlord who is rich in delicacies and delicacies every day, and then says to a long-term worker intellectually, "because of the limited economic development, I do not have the ability to let you eat fried meat once a year." But moldy pancakes are guaranteed. You eat, eat and don't rebel. This must be one of the most ridiculous logic in history. If the reform is unable to move, dare not move, and unwilling to move the cheese of urban interest groups, we can only continue to pursue the idea of the first category of peasant land. "ensuring the contract rights of farmers in cities" means that the reform is shirking the responsibility for the urban interest groups.

Secondly,"guaranteeing the contracting rights of farmers in cities" actually means allowing the second and third categories of villagers to "bring land into cities". China's urbanization trend is that the absolute number of the first type of villagers, that is, real farmers, will become smaller and smaller. Finally, only about 200 to 300 million villagers will continue to live and farm in villages as farmers. It accounts for about 30% of the total number of villagers at present. In other words, 70% of villagers will "bring land into the city". They will also take away 70% of the land contract rights and use rights. Even more. This huge group of villagers has been repeatedly favored by the government, protection of the "contract rights." What would they do? First of all, they certainly don't farm directly. Either way, it is directly abandoned. At present, a lot of land in rural Guangdong is in this state. The elite at the top said that this problem could be solved through circulation. However, in the context of the disappearance of village organization, institutional costs rise out of thin air. Farming can mean business failure. How many farmers would be willing to transfer what was already "fragmented" land to farming? In particular, direct cultivation of food crops. Cash crops, market flexibility, risk is actually quite large. At the same time, these fragmented lands are not contiguous or large-scale. They basically have only the most basic security significance, but no economic significance. For the second group of villagers, the risk of working may occur at any time. Local governments basically refused to provide unemployment insurance and old-age insurance. Why do they want to "transfer" land with these security meanings? Therefore, the government hopes to rely on farmers "voluntary" and "circulation" to solve the problem of farmland fragmentation. Agricultural land circulation is not impossible. Some farmers may also expand their scale by transferring land when their agricultural operations are smooth. But they must bear another institutional cost besides the normal cost of agricultural production-rent. The price of land rent is between 500 yuan and 1000 yuan per mu. This means that agriculture, which already has meagre returns, will face the "worse" of land rent. Rent almost doubles the material cost of agriculture. This is an institutional "exploitation" imposed by the reform on the first class of peasants. It can be proved conclusively that agricultural land reform is a failure and a mistake. China's agrarian revolution was originally carried out in accordance with the direction of historical development because of the elimination of landlords and rent. That's why most farmers support it. Only then has promoted China's industrialization and modernization. However, the reform created a large number of landlords out of thin air by "guaranteeing the contracting rights of farmers in cities." Let the second and third types of villagers lie down in the village for a long time and become parasites on the first type of farmers. In rural areas, they believe that they have created divisions and divisions among peasants.

In modern society, land is certainly not the primary form of security. Therefore, replacing land security with social protection is the correct direction of China's urbanization, industrialization and modernization. It is the direction to completely solve the "three rural" problems. Unfortunately, today, when the gap between urban and rural areas continues to widen and the problems of agriculture, rural areas and farmers continue to deteriorate, the reform continues to "guarantee the contracting rights of farmers in cities". To repeat the same old tricks is to shirk responsibility and push China's agriculture, rural areas and peasants further into the abyss.