It is difficult to guarantee the rights and interests of land if the bargaining platform is not perfect.

In the process of the transfer of the contracted management right of rural land, "according to law, voluntary and paid" is the prepositional and principled opinion to protect the fairness of farmers' rights and interests. However, in practice, scattered farmers lack equal bargaining power, and some grass-roots governments, which are supposed to play the role of "notaries", have become the "leading parties" of land transfer. It can be seen that farmers should be helped to establish a fair and transparent market-oriented bargaining platform as soon as possible.

The topic of this issue of "Economic Daily CCTV Joint Review"-- the imperfect bargaining platform is difficult to protect land rights and interests.

Recently, media reported that when implementing a vineyard project, the subdistrict office of Jinyang Road, Yaozhou District, Tongchuan City, Shaanxi Province, forcibly occupied the villagers' cultivated land with an iron net, forcing some villagers to sign on the transfer power of attorney, causing public dissatisfaction.

After the report was published, the local government immediately investigated. However, it is worth noting that the results of the "survey" did not directly respond to the details of the report, but detailed the legal procedures of the transfer work and the excessive behavior of "a small number of farmers". The truth remains to be resolved. But what is certain is that there are great differences of opinion among the parties to the vineyard project.

In recent years, the central government has clearly strengthened the management and service of the transfer of land contractual management rights, and established and improved the relevant policies on the transfer market of land contractual management rights. Among them, "according to law, voluntary, paid" is the preposition and principled opinion to protect the fairness of farmers' rights and interests. Many places also stipulate that the transferred land is invalid without the consent and record of the original contracted peasant household. It can be seen that the intention of protecting farmers in the policy design is very clear. However, in the actual operation, why is it still difficult for farmers to be independent of the land rights and interests that have been confirmed by the state, resulting in a "strong turn" of "circulation"?

Only from the media reports, the problem seems to lie in the weak awareness of the legal system in enterprises and the simplification of the work style of a small number of grass-roots cadres. However, after careful study, we will find that the root of the contradiction lies in the natural defects of the land transfer transaction system, that is, the bargaining power of both parties is seriously unequal. In the final analysis, in the face of highly organized enterprises, scattered farmers lack equal bargaining power.

The purpose of the land transfer policy is to give farmers the right to enter the market and realize value-added. However, the process of transfer and cooperation between enterprises and farmers is bound to be a complex process of negotiation and compromise. Including the above-mentioned case of Yaozhou District in Tongchuan, we find that in a large number of land transfers: first, there is almost no bargaining process, and peasant households are basically divided into two categories: agree and disagree; second, even if a small number of farmers put forward asking prices, however, due to vague expectations, lack of standards or poor negotiation skills, their demands will be regarded as "overpriced", so transaction abortion is inevitable. Third, and the most critical factor, is the vague role of the grass-roots government. Still take Yaozhou District as an example, although Shaanxi Province issued guidelines to promote the transfer of land contractual management rights, and clearly stipulated that "the transferred farmers should consult directly with the transferee; if the village grass-roots organizations act as intermediaries or coordinate the transfer, the power of attorney should be issued by the transferred land farmers." Without entrusting consent, it is not allowed to forcibly replace farmers to transfer land "and other detailed contents, but from the operational practice, the intermediary coordination role of village grass-roots organizations is not independent, and is often dominated by the grass-roots government.

In fact, due to the pressure of development, the thinking of political achievements and even the involvement of interests, some grass-roots governments, which should play the role of "notaries", have changed into the "leading party" of land transfer in practice. In this way, the negotiation between enterprises and farmers is even more unequal: the negotiation between the two sides has quietly become a "2-to-1" game process between enterprises, the government and farmers, in which the bargaining power of farmers is even more impossible.

It can be seen that in the current process of the transfer of rural land contractual management rights, we should help farmers to establish a fair and transparent market-oriented bargaining platform as soon as possible. In this regard, we can learn from the mechanism of rural assets trading centers that are being piloted in some places, and bring the transfer business of land contractual management rights into the standardized trading system-- through intermediary service procedures such as finance, evaluation, settlement, guarantee and payment guarantee, so that farmers' rights and interests of land use rights can be traded, cashed in and added value in an open and fair manner. In this way, the market can play a decisive role in the allocation of resources, not only the original intention of the policy to protect the interests of farmers can be realized, but also the grass-roots government can avoid suspicion and do what the government should do well.