Reflection on the phenomenon of Water Resources grabbing in Rural Industry

I. introduction

After the reform of the tax-sharing system in the 1990s, with the "collection of financial power" and "decentralization of affairs" in the relationship between the state and local governments, "attracting investment" has become an important means for local governments to seek economic growth (Zhou Feizhou, 2006). Attracted by a series of preferential policies of the local government, a lot of private capital began to settle in rural areas and rely on local resources for industrial production. In the mainstream narrative, rural industry is usually regarded as the driving force of rural development and a symbol of progress, showing the ideal picture of "win-win", such as "being able to transfer a large number of rural surplus labor force locally and improve the income level of farmers. Solve the problem of insufficient domestic demand in the macro-economy" (Li Yanzhao, 2008). However, in the rural industrial field, around the use interface of the same resources, especially water resources, the exclusion and marginalization of local villagers by foreign capital has not received due attention in China. Aiming at the phenomenon that strong groups plunder the water rights of marginal and vulnerable groups in order to achieve their own capital accumulation, Mehta et al (Mehta, etc., 2012) called it water resources grabbing.

The research on water resources grabbing originated from the attention of international scholars to the phenomenon of land grabbing, focusing on the discussion of foreign direct investment agriculture (agricultural foreign direct investment) which appears in Africa and other countries to grow biofuels and food crops on a large scale. Taking the research of Woodhouse and Woodhouse and Ganho,2011 as a turning point, water resources grabbing has been paid more and more attention as an important issue hidden behind land grabbing. The study holds that land without water security is meaningless for investors for crop cultivation, and land is only a prerequisite for water acquisition. The characteristics of water flow and circulation make water resources grabbing with strong concealment. Dewey et al. (Duvail, etc., 2012) believe that different from the direct impact of land grabbing, that is, the transfer of land rights, the impact of water grabbing is often indirect, not only lagging in time, but also diffusing in space. As scholars focus on the phenomenon of water grabbing and broaden their research horizons, Mehta et al (Mehta,etc., 2012) pointed out that in many situations, water itself is the object of capture, and its use is not limited to crop cultivation, but may also be used in mining processing and hydropower production (Sosa and Zwarteween,2012;Wagle,etc., 2012; Matthews,2012; Islar,2012). Generally speaking, the foreign research on water resources grabbing mainly adopts the Marxist theoretical perspective, which aims to reveal the rational narrative, institutional basis, power operation mechanism and water differentiation in the process of water resources grabbing. From the perspective of environmental sociology, the relevant domestic research has analyzed and discussed the environmental problems reflected in the impact of water resources grabbing. For example, Chen Ajiang (2000) took the East Village of Taihu Lake Basin as a case to analyze the causes of industrial pollution in local waters from a sociological point of view. It is considered that "the imbalance of the power of stakeholders, the administration of rural grass-roots organizations and the demise of villagers' self-organization, as well as the loss of traditional ethical norms in rural communities" are the main factors. From a cultural point of view, Wang Xiaoyi (2010) believes that the transfer of knowledge and power between rural and external forces is an important cause of rural environmental problems in the context of development.

Although the above studies have different perspectives and focuses, there is a consensus that the problems of water differentiation and water pollution caused by water resources grabbing are not simple environmental or technical problems. In essence, the seizure of water resources is a political issue related to the allocation of water resources, which is related to the livelihood and survival interests of the seized party. Foreign discussions on water resources grabbing also provide a new perspective for understanding the development of rural industrialization. As for the phenomenon of grabbing water resources hidden in agro-industrial production under the cloak of "development", the question that should be reflected is: "who" is using "whose" water, satisfying the development of "who"? What are the gains and losses of local villagers in water distribution, and do they have room for choice? Taking the rural industry-iron separation plant in Songcun, Hebei Province, as an example, this paper attempts to interpret the change and logic of water distribution structure behind the phenomenon of water resources grabbing caused by iron separation plant from the point of view of political economy under the background of attracting investment and investment. and on this basis to reflect on the development of investment.

Introduction to the background of the village

Song Village is located in the western mountain area of Qinglin County, Hebei Province, the upper reaches of the Cang River, with an annual precipitation of about 400 milliliters. The total area of the village is 26000 mu, with only 479mu of arable land. The crops include wheat, corn and peanuts, which are mainly used for their own consumption. The local soil is mostly sandy, the soil layer is thin, the water storage capacity is poor, and 2/3 of the cultivated land is dry land. The cultivated land with irrigation source guarantee is also known locally as "irrigated land". It is mainly located by the riverside and is artificially reclaimed in the "Agriculture Learning Dazhai" movement in the 1970s. Supporting water conservancy facilities-two main canals and three irrigation wells provide facilities for irrigation. When there is water in the river, villagers usually give priority to diverting river water for self-flow irrigation, and when there is no water, they use pumping equipment to get irrigation well water. Because the pumping equipment needs to be driven by diesel or electricity, by contrast, river water is free water and is also called "tap water" by locals. Due to the small area of arable land, irrigated agriculture plays an important role in ensuring that the local people are self-sufficient in food. According to the old man in the village, before "agriculture learned from Dazhai," the villagers planted only one crop of corn. In the words of the villagers, the harvest was "not enough to eat, poor for half a year, and rich for half a year," but after the area of cultivated land expanded, people began to grow spring wheat, and "life was better." Planting wheat requires a large amount of water, and it should be watered at least ten times before harvest. Because the spring river is in the dry season, the river is relatively tight, and the villagers have great tension in water demand, and there has been a competition for water because of irrigation.

Songcun was originally a traditional agricultural community of family planning, but after the reform of the tax-sharing system, especially after the reform of taxes and fees, the local government of Songcun convened village cadres to hold meetings many times to promote "attracting investment." encourage the village to provide convenient conditions for land use for investors. The spirit of the meeting, such as "do not keep the golden rice bowl and beg for food" and "do not develop the opportunities for others to develop themselves", have become the leading principles for localities to seek economic development. After 2003, with the price of iron powder rising all the way, the profit space of iron concentrator expanded rapidly. Driven by local preferential policies, relying on the geographical advantages of local proximity to mines, more convenient transportation and "abundant" water sources, more than ten iron concentrators have successively entered Song Village, mainly for iron powder screening and processing. In the processing process of iron separation, the iron ore needs to be crushed at first, then the iron powder is sucked out by magnetic separator, and the remaining crushed stone powder (that is, tailings) is washed away continuously with a large amount of water, so water is an indispensable production factor in the process of screening iron powder. The emergence of the iron dressing plant has brought great changes to the society, economy and environment of Songcun. "the whole community became lively and active, and all kinds of transport vehicles shuttled back and forth on rural roads" (Zhang Bingqian, 2005). Hearing the news, many migrant villagers began to return to their hometown for employment, such as working in iron dressing plants, pulling ore transportation, opening snack bars and vegetable shops. At the same time, the iron dressing plant has also attracted a lot of immigrants and opened a local car repair and machinery repair shop. However, the iron dressing plant not only promotes the local economy, but also brings the problem of water use. A year after the emergence of the iron separation plant, due to the massive occupation of the river, the amount of water available to the villagers was reduced, and the local agricultural planting structure also changed, and the farming arrangements for two seasons a year were changed to one-season drought-resistant corn because of "water shortage." According to the villagers, the irrigated land before the village has become dry land. In addition to the vegetable land, the cultivated land mainly depends on Rain Water's irrigation, which is also what the villagers mean by "relying on heaven for a living." Although the flow of the river varies seasonally, the water distribution between the iron concentrator and the villagers has been structured.

Third, whose water: the formation and strengthening of water distribution structure

According to the Water Law of the people's Republic of China, agricultural water use should take precedence over industrial water use. But in Song Village, although the villagers have priority "abstract water rights", but in the actual water use structure, the villagers'"specific water rights" are marginalized (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan,2005). Zhang Junfeng (2005, 2009) believes that the water diversion rules are the result of consultation and competition among relevant interest groups. When the structure of stakeholders changes, the old water diversion rules will be required to be rewritten and reformulated. The change of water distribution structure also means the transfer of actual control over water. This part attempts to analyze from three aspects: the prelude to the circle water of the iron dressing plant, the strategy and the response of the villagers. the purpose is to explore the logic and mechanism behind the distribution of production water in the village, why the villagers change the planting structure and how to understand the villagers' coping behavior.

(1) the prelude to a circle of water

As the premise of obtaining water resources, land is closely related to water. With the increasingly prominent problem of water resources and the construction and strengthening of a series of international conferences and policy discourses, the management of water and land is classified, and the relationship between water and land begins to be weakened and separated. However, under this dichotomy cognitive framework, what is easy to be obscured is the water grabbing process (Woodhouse and Ganho,2011) in the land grabbing phenomenon for the purpose of water. In the process of water grabbing, land is only a prelude to encircling water. In Songcun, the concealment of the iron concentrator's grabbing of village water resources happens to be reflected in the requisition and compensation of land.

From the decision-making process of land expropriation and compensation standards, villagers are excluded from the negotiation process and lack the right to express their own interests. According to the villagers, the land requisition contract of the iron concentrator in the village is signed by the iron concentrator and the village collective rather than by the individual villagers, and the content of the contract is also determined by consultation between the iron concentrator and village cadres, and ordinary villagers do not have the right to participate in decision-making. As outsiders of the village, the investors of the iron dressing plant find it difficult to "talk" with the villagers themselves, and actively attract village cadres in order to obtain the right to use the village land. In the description of the villagers, this kind of courtship is embodied in the "good treatment fee" given by the iron concentrator to the cadres and the "gifts" for festivals. As a response to the "gift" of the iron concentrator and the investment policy of the superior, village cadres, as "middlemen", play an active role in the process of occupying land of the iron concentrator, and make use of their authority in the village to establish rationality for the occupation of the iron concentrator. The cultivated land occupied by the iron dressing plant is mainly used for plant construction, and the ground needs to be leveled and reformed to cement ground to bear the weight of processing equipment. However, due to the thin local soil layer, many of them are converted into arable land on the river beach. once paved with cement, the cultivated land is difficult to restore or even unable to continue farming. However, in the process of land expropriation, village cadres continue to release the economic benefits that can be brought by the ironworks in the general election, using the narrative of non-agricultural employment to establish rationality for the ironworks, such as "better than farming; they can earn money on their doorstep without having to go out to work." As the village cadres restrain the internal and external resources of the village, many villagers fall into the awkward situation of being "neither willing to be recruited nor opposed" under the persuasion of the village cadres. Generally speaking, these employment and income narratives of village cadres are all from the perspective of short-term economic benefits, and the essence is to serve the iron dressing plant, not out of consideration of the interests of the villagers. Although the damaged cultivated land has a clause to restore the landform as a form of compensation in the contract, it will eventually be cashed in cash, but from the point of view of damage to interests, while the villagers transfer the right to use the land, there is also the loss of the long-term survival guarantee function carried by the land.

Another hidden function behind this survival guarantee function is the right to the use of water. The iron concentrator obtains not only the right to use the land, but also the specific water rights of the villagers, but the water compensation is not reflected in the land compensation. As far as the compensation provided by the iron dressing plant is concerned, the compensation standard is mainly calculated on the basis of the grain output of the land occupied. I learned from the interview with the villagers, "there is no compensation for the use of water. If you requisition a piece of land and drill a well, the land will be compensated." But in fact, the iron dressing plant occupies not only the land of the villagers, but also a lot of water. The fixity and boundary of the land determine that the number of land area occupied by the iron concentrator is specific, and the number of villagers who receive land compensation is also specific, but the water is flowing, and the potential impact brought by the water of the iron concentrator is regional, which means that all the villagers in the village are directly affected by the water used by the iron concentrator, and the water compensation is completely missing. According to the villagers, after the land is expropriated, the water can be used "casually". Therefore, when the villagers sell the land, there are specific water rights hidden behind the transferred land use rights, and the iron dressing plant to obtain the land use rights also provides a prerequisite for the occupation of production water.

(2) the strategy and logic of encircling water

The iron dressing plant in Songcun is a private investment, and profit is its primary purpose. As long as there are enough raw materials for iron ore, the iron concentrator usually operates 24 hours a day, and the continuity of processing increases the water consumption of the iron concentrator. According to the villagers, "as soon as the factory started, there was no water in the river." In order to facilitate the collection of water, many iron concentrators prefer to build a plant by the river. According to the type of cultivated land occupied by the iron concentrator in the village, 70% is irrigated land. In order to ensure the required water consumption, all iron concentrators have water storage tanks deeper than village irrigation wells along the river to occupy the river. The reservoir of the iron concentrator is usually between three and five meters deep, while the deepest irrigation well in the village is three meters. In addition, the iron concentrator also makes use of economic advantages to use high-power pumping equipment to pump water directly from the river when there is too much water. The pumping equipment of the iron dressing plant usually uses a three-inch pump, which can pump about 70 to 80 cubic meters of water per hour, while the pump used by the villagers is a two-inch pump, which can only pump 18 cubic water per hour. During the dry season of the river, the owner of the iron concentrator will also use forklifts to dig sand in the river to build an interception dam, store water from the upper reaches, and then introduce it into the reservoir with water pipes or pumping equipment. When the river is tight, in order to prevent people from "stealing water", the factory will also find someone to watch the water during the day. From the perspective of water demand, different from the seasonal water demand of the agricultural system, factory water follows the capital logic, and water is only the raw materials used for production and processing and accumulation. According to the local environmental protection regulations, the iron concentrator should treat and recycle the waste water. In addition to the pipe for draining the tailings, each factory needs to install a return pipe to pump the water from the tailings back into the well. However, from the interview with the villagers, we learned that the iron concentrator will recycle the waste water only when the river water is very little. when the river water is long, the waste water is discharged directly into the river, so that when the factory is in operation, "the river water is muddy." The continuous discharge and water use of the iron dressing plant also means that its demand for river water is increasing, and squeezing the water access space of the villagers.

In the villagers' understanding, the river water belongs to the public open resources, but the iron concentrator not only privatizes the public resources by building water conservancy facilities, but also repels the original users. The water circle occupation of the iron concentrator is essentially a kind of predatory accumulation (Sosa and Zwarteveen, 2012). The relationship between the river and the livelihood of the local people and the water needs of the local people are ignored in the view of capital. The squeezed water access space has also contributed to the water shortage at the cognitive level of the villagers. As Mehta,2011 revealed the social construction behind the water shortage, the water shortage mentioned by the villagers actually refers to the gap between the water needed by the villagers and the water they can obtain, rather than the absolute natural water shortage. In view of the differences in water acquisition capacity, the iron concentrator uses water conservancy facilities and pumping equipment to encircle the river water based on capital advantages, reducing the free river water that villagers can use. the latter can only use well water or waste water discharged by Rain Water or even the factory as an alternative source of irrigation. There is no need to pay cash cost to use river water, but it is necessary to pay electricity bill to extract well water. Under the pressure of commercialization of water acquisition, the choice of water for villagers is further squeezed. Irrigation with polluted "tap water" is also a "no choice" for villagers. A woman who worked in an iron dressing plant tried to "defend" the water impact of the factory. "there is still water use in the factory, but there is no water in the factory if it is not in operation." However, from the perspective of the choice space of the villagers, this is a helpless expression of using water under the two-way pressure of cash income and water demand.

(3) villagers' coping and strengthening of water distribution structure

In the view of Kerkvliet,2009, resource allocation is a political process, which is full of competition among relevant stakeholders around specific resources, and the social relations between subjects determine the final distribution of resources. Some scholars have also pointed out that the competition of water resources is not static but a dynamic process (Funder and Bustamante,2012). The water resources distribution structure of Song Village is also the result of the game of interests between the villagers and the iron concentrator. Although villagers are constantly marginalized in water distribution, they are not completely passive receivers, and they also adopt daily political behaviors ranging from "stealing water" to "adjustment" in their coping strategies, which reflect more of the "resilience of self-preservation", but also strengthen the water allocation structure dominated by capital (Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott, 2011).

Before the emergence of the iron dressing plant, Songcun's farming arrangement was two crops a year: wheat and corn. The water demand for wheat planting is relatively large, and March to May is the dry season of the river, which is also the growing period of wheat. The river is already in a tense state to meet the irrigation needs of the villagers, as exemplified by the competition for water among the villagers. However, with the addition of iron dressing plant as a new main body of water use, the demand tension of river water has been further enlarged. Some villagers recalled the scene at that time, "there was not enough water in the river. The factory found forklifts and used sand to change the water in the other bay of the river. the top cut off the river, and there was no water at all. there was no tap water at all, and there was no water at all." if you want to water it, you can't get it down at all. " In order to prevent villagers from grabbing water, the factory also sent special guards during the day. In the villagers' understanding, the factory is a force that "can't be annoyed", and they are "ordinary people" and "have no power and power, and they can't do anything with their words." Looking for trouble, scolding won't work. It costs money to file a lawsuit. Village cadres play more two-sided roles in this secret battle for water: on the one hand, as the power elite of the village, safeguarding the interests of the villagers is the legitimate basis of the power of the village cadres, and the irrigation needs of the villagers cannot be ignored; on the other hand, the interests of the village cadres and the iron concentrator make them opposite to the interests of the villagers. In order to maintain the balance of the interests of both sides, village cadres will negotiate with the iron concentrator and give priority to the villagers' irrigation water only when the drought is more serious. In order to avoid the risk of confrontation with the iron concentrator and to be "resented" by village cadres, some villagers adopted the strategy of "stealing water" and chose to dig holes in the river dam at night and change the water for irrigation. In the face of strong capital, most villagers choose silence because of "no power", but silence is also a security strategy to avoid risks and protect themselves. However, with the increase in the number of iron concentrators, there is less and less space available for such safety strategies. Within a short period of a year, ten iron concentrators have appeared in the village, the river is less and less, and the space for villagers to use weapons of the weak has also been squeezed. Unable to carry out external resistance, farmers can only adjust themselves, rearrange the planting structure, give up wheat planting and switch to drought-resistant corn to reduce irrigation water demand, and have to turn to off-land income for survival.