The main problems, lines, principles and policies of current agricultural and rural reform and development

First, the main problems

(1) the cost of grain is getting higher and higher, the specific price of grain is getting lower and lower, the decriminalization of land is serious, and the security crisis of grain and other major agricultural products is becoming more and more obvious.

The state agriculture and statistics departments have said that China's grain and other major agricultural products have achieved "ten consecutive increases", with a total output of more than 120 billion jin. The per capita share of staple grain has reached 900 jin, a record high. But at the same time, net imports of grain and related products grew by double digits, reaching 14 billion jin in 2013, an all-time high. The self-sufficiency rate of major agricultural products set by the state is 95%, while the actual self-sufficiency rate has dropped to less than 90%.

Has China's grain really achieved "ten consecutive increases"? Will the per capita grain output reach 900 jin and the net imports of grain and related products continue to grow at double-digit rates? The per capita grain of India is less than 400jin, and its grain production is slower than that of our country, but its population growth is much faster than that of our country, but India's grain import is less than 1/10 of that of our country, and its import growth rate is also far less than ours.

Could it be that, on the contrary, the output of grain and other major agricultural products in China is in a relatively low period?

It is an indisputable fact that agriculture for the elderly (food production) is now under way. Since 1990, the price of grain harvesting and storage in China has only increased by 6 times, while the rest has increased by 6 times. Of course, only the old people left behind who have no market price for labor are engaged in grain production. General Secretary Xi is also worried about who will farm the land (food) in the future.

Worried that no one is engaged in grain production, the government promotes land transfer and gives financial subsidies to so-called leading agricultural enterprises or large households to transfer land from old farmers at high prices-- so-called intensive management. now the average land transfer price is 800 yuan per mu year, Russia is only 2 yuan per mu year, the United States is only less than 100 yuan per mu year, and Japan is only between 100 yuan and 150 yuan per mu year. Will China's leading agricultural enterprises or large households produce food after renting the land of old farmers at a high price?

The author has traveled all over the country and seen the production bases of countless leading agricultural enterprises. Hundreds of mu, thousands of mu of land or dozens or hundreds of continuous greenhouses with grass growing without growing crops can be found everywhere. The author has been to hundreds of villages every year, and the grain production has been reduced year after year and reported to increase production year after year.

I do not understand that no one believes that leading agricultural enterprises or large households would rather abandon and not produce food after they have acquired land. Why do governments at all levels promote the concentration of high prices of agricultural land to leading agricultural enterprises and large households on the grounds of food security? Driven by the wrong policies, the more subsidies and inputs from the central government to agriculture, the crazier the local governments will do such unreasonable things. The end result is: the continuous increase in grain production is false, and the continuous increase in net grain imports is inevitable!

(2) mistakes have been made in rural reforms such as the land system, management system and grass-roots government system, grass-roots organizations and governments are becoming more and more lax, and rural governance is becoming more and more ineffective.

1. With the unfair and unreasonable policies such as "permanent permanent" and legalization of unfair and unreasonable policies such as farmers' occupation of land without paying rent ("no occupation of land, no occupation of rent") and "more occupation and subsidy" (agricultural subsidies are approved according to the area of land), the phenomenon of violent occupation continues unabated. It also induced the uncontrolled expansion of homestead and private land, and even induced many people to attack the legitimacy of the Communist revolution and take out the land deeds of 65 years ago to recover the "ancestral property". Land system is not only the root of agriculture, but also the root of rural economy, rural society, rural politics, rural ecology and rural culture. Fairness-land to the tiller, equal land rights and rising prices to the public are the most fundamental principles for the construction and improvement of the rural land system, which no longer exists in the discourse of reform. This is the source of chaos in agriculture and rural areas.

2. For a long time, land reform, agricultural industrial policy and rural economic policy adjustment have not evolved in the direction of consolidating the peasant village community and its autonomy, but completely opposite. In particular, while abolishing the agricultural tax, it has also abolished the right of the village community collective (community) to collect land contract fees by virtue of its land ownership. as a result, the democratic autonomy system of the village community under the leadership of the party branch loses the support of the property right system and economic foundation, and the party's leadership is weakening in rural areas, and the trend of dark socialization in rural society is becoming more and more obvious, and this trend continues to spread.

3. Since the reform, the functions and powers of the township government have been continuously weakened, and there is basically no command over the functional departments (articles) under its jurisdiction, coupled with the gradual disintegration of the rural villagers' village community. It is almost impossible for the township party committee and the government to exercise their power legally or normally and effectively-the large number of illegal survival of township governments we have seen is actually the result of being forced into scoundrels. At present, the daily work of the vast majority of township governments is generally left with "four major items": compiling data, preventing petitions from farmers, dealing with family planning examinations and running projects. And a common feature of the vast majority of township party committees and governments to complete these "four major" work is "fake". It is extremely rare that the economic data, family planning data, financial revenue and expenditure data and project fund use data of central transfer payments are not falsified. "fraud" is the "necessity" of grass-roots party committees and governments to cope with the above or to maintain their own existence. The level of "fraud" represents the work level of the grass-roots party committee and government. "falsification" is the greatest practical and realistic task of the grass-roots party committee and government.

(3) the opening of agricultural industry to the outside world is out of control, endangering national security

Under the background of globalization, relying on their agricultural technological advantages and capital strength, the United States and other countries, using free trade as a weapon, try to occupy the market share of agricultural products of other countries and compete for pricing power-- to pursue stable market share income and pricing power income, that is, to implement the strategy of "weaponization" of agricultural products and to "control" the economic, political and social security of other countries. This is not only the inevitable strategic choice of the third stage of agricultural development in developed countries, but also the inevitable strategic choice of the leading countries under the background of globalization.

In the context of globalization, China, a developing country with a large population, must ensure the autonomy of its agricultural industry in order to maintain its own security. However, after China's entry into WTO, agriculture has been liberalized without precaution. Whether it is technology or seed, its autonomy is weakening day by day; whether it is the overseas market share and pricing power of labor-intensive agricultural products, or the domestic market share and pricing power of land-intensive agricultural products, its autonomy is weakening day by day. Whether it is the production, storage, processing, logistics and retail of agricultural products and related products, the entry of foreign capital is unimpeded, and many local governments even cede the grain purchase and marketing system to foreign capital. If this trend continues, it will inevitably endanger national security.

(4) Agricultural modernization deviates from farmers' urbanization, which leads to higher and higher social risks of modernization transformation.

At the beginning of the reform, China's rural registered population was more than 700 million. After more than 30 years of rapid development of reform and opening up, China's rural household registration population has increased to more than 900 million. In all the first-developing countries and regions before the "four Little Dragons" of Asia, in the context of industrialization and urbanization, when the per capita GDP reached 4500 US dollars, the rural population was basically urbanized-only less than 15 per cent of the agricultural rural population was left. The industrialization of our country is coming to an end, the per capita GDP has exceeded 7000 US dollars, and the registered population of rural farmers has increased from 700 million at the initial stage to more than 900 million now, which is unprecedented in the process of modernization of all the first-developing countries and regions in the world. The author's explanation for this phenomenon is that after the gradient transfer of the global general manufacturing industry to China, there has been a "China inflection point"-- the global general manufacturing industry has reversed from a few manufacturing for the majority to a majority manufacturing for the minority-- the general manufacturing surplus. The low wage income of Chinese migrant workers can not support the high cost of urbanization of Chinese migrant workers. The export-oriented industrialization in the context of China's reform and opening up, the development of general manufacturing, has only created 200-300 million urban refugees, but failed to create 200-300 million urban citizens and families.

However, the road and policy arrangement of China's agricultural modernization is based on the "first-mover experience" of more than 85% of the rural population entering the cities for citizenization. After the emergence of the "China inflection point" in the global general manufacturing industry, this "first-mover experience" has actually become a fallacy. If agricultural modernization and peasant urbanization are not considered at the same time-agricultural modernization requires the land of small farmers rather than small farmers (people), industrial modernization and urbanization require the labor force of migrant workers rather than migrant workers (people), the social risks of China's modernization transformation may lead to the failure of China's modernization.

Second, the choice of road principles and policies

First, on the path of agriculture and rural development.

If we face squarely the objective existence of the "China inflection point" of the global general manufacturing industry and its influence, and if we face up to the reality that the rural population has not decreased but increased by 200 million under the background of the rapid development of China's reform and opening up for more than 30 years, it is necessary to reconsider the road of China's rural and agricultural modernization.

With regard to the road of rural and agricultural modernization in China, the essence is the organizational mode of farmers and agriculture, which can be highly summarized as two ways: one is to take the agricultural and rural modernization road of the alliance between the government and the new bourgeoisie to eliminate small farmers; the other is to take the agricultural and rural modernization road of the government supporting village communities (communities) to turn traditional small farmers into organized modern small farmers. The former is the "Philippine road", which proves to be the road of failure, while the latter is the road of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and proves to be the road of success. Under the background that industrialization is coming to an end, the speed of economic development has slowed down, and there are still more than 900 million rural registered residents, how can the government choose the agricultural and rural modernization road of alliing with the new bourgeoisie to eliminate small farmers? The rapid transformation of the problem of rural farmers into the problem of urban migrant workers is not only more difficult to solve, but also dangerous. It may take longer for China to solve the peasant problem than the first countries and regions before the "four Little Dragons" in Asia, and it may take several generations of "free choice" for the rural population to stabilize. Therefore, the erroneous practice of supporting leading enterprises to merge small farmers must be stopped and corrected. In a long historical period, the government must take the fundamental starting point and focus of its principles and policies to support the construction and development of small rural social communities and rely on them to lead the modernization of rural agriculture.

Second, the three basic systems of agriculture, rural areas and farmers. If, for a long historical period, we must rely on the village community to lead the development, construction and governance of rural agriculture, then we must confirm that the village community (civilian) community under the leadership of the party branch is the basic organizational system of farmers. The "unified and separate two-tier management system" in the village community is the basic management system of agriculture and rural economy. The system of democratic autonomy of village community (people) is the basic governance system in rural areas. The basic organizational system, the basic management system and the basic governance system are a whole. The "two-tier management system with the combination of unity and division", the "basic management system", has been written into the Constitution, and the other two basic systems should also be written into the Constitution and adhere to it for a long time. On the three basic systems is a complete system, the author has a special discussion in the book "telling the truth to the prime minister again", which is not wordy here. In particular, it should be pointed out that the three basic systems exist on the basis of collective ownership of rural land community (members). The shaken collective ownership of rural land shakes the foundation of the development, construction and governance of agriculture, rural areas and farmers. The Central Committee stresses that the bottom line that rural agricultural reform should not touch the collective ownership of land is completely correct and must be unswervingly adhered to. Only when the "three bases" are determined, can the formulation of policies not be wavering and changeable, can transfer payments have a foothold, can policies be implemented, can the development of agriculture, rural areas and farmers have subjectivity, and can most people share the fruits of reform and development.

Third, about the improvement of the rural land financial system. Now, the mainstream people who have the right to speak generally understand that only when the land (agricultural land) is privatized, the farmland can be mortgaged in financial institutions, and the farmers' farmland is the real property of the farmers. This kind of understanding is one-sided, even confused. Vietnam's land has been privatized for more than 20 years, but Vietnamese farmers' farmland still cannot be mortgaged in financial institutions. The farmland of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan does not realize the mortgage loan in the formal financial institutions, but in the internal finance of the peasant community (rural peasant association or peasant association). The farmland of small farmers in East Asia is completely different from that of large farmers in the United States, and they are also completely different farmers. Large tracts of agricultural land in the United States can be mortgaged in formal financial institutions, or the property rights of agricultural land in the United States match with formal finance. On the other hand, the farmland of East Asian small farmers can not become the collateral of formal financial institutions. In our country, it is not that the land system does not adapt to the financial system, but that the financial system does not adapt to the land system (the author has a special chapter in "telling the Prime Minister the truth again", which is not cumbersome here). The author calls the mutual cooperation finance within the peasant organization (village community) as "built-in finance", and has done a large number of village community "built-in finance" experiments. The experiments show that as long as mutual assistance and cooperation finance is established within the village community, the contracted land and collective membership rights of the members of the village community can be mortgaged in the "built-in finance". As long as the members' contract right and share ownership under the collective ownership of rural land are matched by "built-in finance", the mobility of the land right and the withdrawal right of the member right can be realized. The farmland of small farmers in East Asia is different from that of large farmers in the United States, and they can only realize the right of mortgage loan in "built-in finance". In China, it is not that the farmland system does not adapt to the financial system, but that the financial system does not adapt to the farmland system. If this issue is not explained clearly, if a small number of people want to privatize, the majority will follow in a muddle. In fact, under the condition of market economy, the collective ownership of land in the village community is not public ownership in the traditional sense, but a form of private ownership as well as a form of private ownership. This kind of "share private ownership (special shareholding system)" of the members of the community can only be fully implemented by relying on the support of the community's "built-in finance".

China's rural areas have maintained small-scale peasant agriculture and small-scale peasant society for thousands of years, and the most fundamental reason is that financial supply is ineffective and organizational supply is ineffective. The most fundamental reason for the ineffectiveness of financial supply is that there is no development of village community "built-in finance". The ineffectiveness of organizational supply is also highly related to the ineffectiveness of financial supply. If the "built-in finance" of the village community is strong, the effectiveness of the village community (organization) will be greatly improved. China's rural financial reform and the improvement of land property rights should be considered as a whole with the choice of the road of modernization of agriculture, rural areas and farmers and the construction of "three bases". For more than a hundred years, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have only allowed rural farmers' organizations (peasant associations or peasant associations) to have "built-in finance" and restricted other financial development.This is worth learning from. We must be determined to correct the mistakes in the direction of rural financial reform in recent decades, and the central finance should focus on supporting the development of "built-in finance" in the development village community. Now there is a lot of financial direct investment in rural agriculture, and the growth is very fast, so the crowding-out effect can not be ignored. Fiscal funds should be spent more to support the development of "built-in finance".

Fourth, break through the ideological obstacles to rural reform and development and reform in accordance with the law. In his later years, Deng Xiaoping positioned "contracting" as an "excessive" model to solve the problem of food and clothing. He stressed that common prosperity must be "a second leap"-the development of collective economy. President Xi stressed that the two three decades should not be opposed to each other, and stressed that rural agricultural reform must adhere to the bottom line of collective land ownership and emphasize the development of the collective economy and the realization of common prosperity. This is fully in line with China's reality and the aspirations of the people. However, in China's universities and research institutions, in virtual worlds such as online media, in legal circles, in financial circles and in private entrepreneurs, there is always another reform ideology that dominates the development of rural reform: you advocate collective ownership of land. He attacked it as "property rights are not clear" and put on the label of anti-reform. Emphasizing the collective economy and "common prosperity" attacks "egalitarianism", and he puts on the label of "retrogression in reform"; if you advocate rebuilding the village community, he attacks and labels it as "left" to revive the "people's commune"; when you emphasize the core role of the party branch, he attacks it as "one-party autocracy" and puts on the label of opposing democratic autonomy. If you emphasize food security, he will attack and label it as "anti-market economy" in order to revive the "planned economy". The goal of reform in the minds of these people is the privatization of the economy and the political multi-party system. Although the number is small, they have a great say. After their interpretation, any resolution of the Central Committee is not a resolution of the Central Committee at all. Therefore, reform must be brought into the track of legalization, the ideology of reform according to law must be established, reform must be carried out in accordance with the law, and illegal reform must be pursued.