A small number of village officials become the powder kegs that trigger group incidents.

Controlling the "absolute power" of village officials by means of the rule of law and institutional means is the fundamental way to rectify the violation of discipline and law by village officials.

There is a film called "Don't treat yourself as a cadre." Feng Gong plays Wang Xi, the head of a textile factory, who is not a big official, but he demands himself strictly according to the standards of cadres everywhere, always keeping in mind that "being an official is not a decision for the people, it is better to go home and sell fermented bean curd." it is supported by the masses. In reality, however, there are some grass-roots "petty officials" who use their power not to forget that they are cadres, but when they become corrupt, they believe that they are "beyond the control of the law and do not make money for nothing." they have opened their mouths of greed to public resources.

It is reported that in recent years, grass-roots cadres, especially "village officials" have gradually become areas hardest hit by corruption. In Jishou, Hunan, after being investigated for embezzlement of public funds, a village cadre unexpectedly asked confidently, "I became a village cadre just to get two people. How can this still be illegal?" Speaking so brazenly, it not only reveals the distorted logic behind the rampant corruption of village officials, but also exposes the weakness of the lack of the concept of rule of law in grass-roots governance.

In a legal sense, village cadres are only agents of grass-roots mass self-government organizations, and they really do not belong to state public officials. However, when village officials are "fishing for two," they really should not treat themselves as cadres, thinking that party discipline and state law are out of control. According to the interpretation of the second paragraph of Article 93 of China's Criminal Law, villagers' committees and other village grass-roots organizations assist the people's government in administrative work and make improper profits by taking advantage of their positions in seven cases, such as disaster relief, poverty alleviation and immigration, and compensation for land expropriation, it can constitute the crime of embezzlement, the crime of misappropriating public funds and the crime of accepting bribes. What's more, in addition to the national law, there are stricter party rules and regulations.

Village officials are the image spokesmen of the party and the government at the grass-roots level. Whether they act in accordance with the rules and discipline and concern the vital interests of the people is also related to the orderly operation of the grass-roots level. In reality, most village officials can fulfill their duties and build a good ruling foundation. However, a small number of village officials have become the "pathogens" of grass-roots governance, and even become powder kegs that trigger collective petitions and group incidents. From feasting and extravagance, to nibbling at poverty alleviation funds and food subsidies, to whales swallowing compensation for land expropriation and land transfer fees, the buzzing of corrupt mosquitoes and flies around the masses is nothing more than a collapse to the credibility of the party and the government.

In July this year, the work report of the Central Inspection team bitterly stated that in some places, "the problem of corruption among rural cadres is prominent, and the problem of 'petty officials' corruption is serious." Other statistics show that since 2013, there have been 171 public cases of violation of discipline and law by village officials across the country, of which 12 cases involved more than 10 million yuan, with a total amount of 2.2 billion yuan. Some organizations believe that whether the corruption of low-level officials can be eliminated is the real test of incorruptible politics, and the success or failure of anti-corruption depends on swatting "flies." Although this point of view is debatable, it also reminds us that although the "fly" is not small, it must be as relentless as the "tiger". Only by increasing the intensity of punishing corruption in accordance with the law can we form a strong deterrent to the village officials involved in corruption.

Why do small village officials breed great corruption? The fundamental reason is the loss of supervision and checks and balances of power. For a long time, people are limited to the lack of legal knowledge, and there is nothing they can do about the corruption of village officials. For the sake of developing the economy and maintaining stability, some grass-roots governments often "do not raise the people, officials do not ask; people do not make trouble, officials do not investigate" the problem of corruption of village cadres. The power of village officials is not great, but compared with the weakness of supervision, their relative power is not small, even to the point of "managing heaven, earth and air in the middle". In the case of unrestricted power, village officials inevitably regard the law as a child's play, and treat themselves not as cadres but as emperors. Some people jokingly say that "villager autonomy" in some places has almost become "village official autonomy", which is enough to illustrate this problem.

In this regard, using the rule of law and institutional means to control the absolute power of village officials is the fundamental solution to rectify the violation of discipline and law by village officials. On the one hand, the existing systems such as economic responsibility audit of village cadres and publicity of village affairs must be activated, on the other hand, we should also promote the institutionalization of village-level anti-corruption and let discipline inspection forces sink to the countryside. The fourth Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee proposed to promote the rule of law of grass-roots governance, put forward specific reform requirements for strengthening the concept of the rule of law of grass-roots cadres and strengthening the construction of grass-roots rule of law institutions, and pointed out the direction for solving the problem of anti-corruption at the village level. If we put these requirements into practice and firmly bind the village-level power in the system cage, we will certainly be able to fundamentally reverse the view of the rule of law and power of grass-roots cadres.

The basis for comprehensively promoting the rule of law is at the grass-roots level, and the focus of work is also at the grass-roots level. The countryside should not be the dead corner of anti-corruption, and the governance of village official corruption should rise to the height of promoting the rule of law at the grass-roots level. Only by gnawing off this hard bone at an early date can we lay a more solid foundation for rural China to move towards modernization.