The reform of agriculture, rural areas and farmers should get rid of three major misunderstandings about the reform of household registration system.

I. on the reform of the household registration system

I think the household registration reform over the past 30 years has gone round and round in one circle. Why the reform of the household registration system was not good in the past? if we look at the planning system before the reform, there is no problem with the household registration system, and the dual household registration system between urban and rural areas is entirely reasonable, because it serves the planned economy. It is right to reform the household registration system now, because what we are doing now is not a planned economy, a unified purchase and marketing system, or a rationing system. The problem with the household registration system in the new system is that the national treatment is unequal, discriminates against farmers and hinders free movement. In the past, the ratio of farmers to farmers was equal, the comparison between urban residents was also equal, and the difference between urban and rural areas was not very great, so the patriotic mood of people at that time was high. For example, I have lived in Beijing for more than ten years, it does not give me the same treatment as the average person in Beijing, and I do not feel the dignity of being a Chinese. Many farmers are faced with this problem when they go to work in Beijing, so the household registration system is a big problem. There is no problem with the household registration system itself, which is the problem of welfare differences and treatment discrimination behind the household registration system.

Has the household registration reform been effective over the years? No. Why? In addition to the urban-rural dual system is basically unchanged, but also changed the urban-urban dual system. For example, I am from Shanghai, and now I am transferred to Beijing. If it is not a transfer within the state-owned enterprise system, even if you become an uncle of Beijing, you will still not be able to enjoy the treatment of Beijing. This is called the city-city dual system. There is also the enterprise-enterprise dual system, which means that there is a dual system within an enterprise, and there is also a dual system between enterprises. People within the system do not work, while people outside the system can be paid nothing but temporary wages. Although it is a transfer within the company, Beijing does not give hukou indicators, still can not enjoy the treatment of Beijing. So you will find out why the reform of the household registration system is not good, because the difference in the benefits added to the household registration system is getting bigger and bigger.

Originally, the basic task of the reform of the household registration system is to achieve equality of basic treatment for citizens, such as education, health care and so on. If there is no difference in treatment, then the household registration reform will be completed. This matter can only be led by the central government, not by the local government. For example, during the household registration reform in the 1980s, a farmer set up an urban hukou for 20,000 yuan, and many people trusted the relationship to buy an urban hukou, which was actually sold by the local government. For example, in the household registration reform in Beijing, a doctor is introduced and a hukou is rewarded. How can household registration be a reward? When local governments use household registration as a means of profit and as a prize, this kind of reform is difficult to succeed. Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen all have their own local interests. Therefore, household registration reform should be a matter for the central government, and if local governments are allowed to do it, it will lead to more and more chaos. However, we can see that the central government has recently introduced a vigorous household registration reform, which is the responsibility of the central government. I think this is going out of the original misunderstanding, which is commendable.

II. On the Reform of Rural Land Financial system

I think some reforms related to finance and agricultural land have also entered a misunderstanding in recent years. Have the reforms related to the farmland financial system been reformed yet? Rural credit cooperatives have been changed into commercial banks, and credit cooperation has not developed (only 43 have been approved nationwide), while village banks and small guarantee companies have become popular. Of course, rural finance should engage in cooperative finance, all finance may be alienated into other finance, only cooperative finance is the farmers' own finance. Therefore, in order to solve the problems of agriculture, rural areas and farmers, we should give priority to the development of cooperative finance. For more than 100 years, Japan only allowed the development of agricultural credit and restricted other financial development, as did South Korea and Taiwan. Taiwan only allows farmers' associations and the Ministry of Agricultural Information to develop and set aside NT $8 billion as seed funds to guide the development of rural finance. The maximum interest on a 100-yuan loan for Taiwanese farmers is no more than 3 yuan, which is usually 1%, or even interest-free.

Due to the non-agricultural financial reform in rural areas and the lack of cooperation among rural internal organizations, the right to contract and management of rural land is lack of internal financial support. However, our academic circles generally blame the land system for the lack of financial support in rural areas, and believe that only when the land is privately owned or the three rights are separated, the land mortgage loan can be realized. But Vietnam's land reform has been privatized. Can it implement mortgages? neither can it. I have communicated with Vietnamese executives many times, and what they are worried about is why the land has been privatized and the farmers' land cannot be mortgaged in the bank. No bank accepts farmers' land. They asked why land in Taiwan and Japan could be loaned. I replied that the land rights of farmers in East Asia are different from those of farmers in the United States, and the continuous pieces of land in the United States are matched with their management system, and small-scale land in East Asia cannot become the collateral of formal financial institutions. Because first, the cost is high; second, information asymmetry; third, there is the risk of default. We are now separating the right of management and centralizing land management. This is a useful attempt, but it may not be successful. Because the right of management has endless constraints in the process of realization, unlike stocks, which can be traded immediately. So how did Taiwan and Japan do it? If there is a Ministry of Rural Information in the peasant association of a township or county, the Ministry of Rural Information will be able to accept land mortgage loans from farmers. Why? First, the cost is low and the salary is not so high; second, the information is symmetrical; and third, if the money is not repaid, the peasant association can manage your land and can be realized immediately. Therefore, the built-in financial system of East Asian small farmers matches the cooperative credit system.