Thoughts on the marketization of Rural Collective assets Management under the New situation

At the end of September this year, the fifth meeting of the Central leading Group for comprehensively deepening Reform examined and approved the pilot plan on farmers' joint-stock cooperation and the reform of shareholding rights in rural collective assets, and proposed to "actively explore effective forms of collective ownership." we will constantly expand the strength of the collective economy and constantly increase the property income of farmers. " In the future, how to take marketization as the direction, focus on property rights reform, accelerate system reform and mechanism innovation, stimulate the endogenous vitality of rural collective economy, and gradually explore the effective realization form of collective economy under the condition of market economy? it is a very urgent task for us to safeguard and realize the property rights of farmers.

The present situation and predicament of Rural Collective assets Management

In recent years, the development of rural collective economy in China has encountered a bottleneck, and collective asset management is generally in a dilemma, which is embodied in the following aspects:

(1) the farmers' ability of specialization and marketization is insufficient. At present, farmers have two asymmetries in facing the market: the first asymmetry is information asymmetry, that is, compared with general market subjects, farmers are obviously insufficient in owning and obtaining information, and there are also great disadvantages in accurately analyzing and judging market information. The second asymmetry is the asymmetry of ability. compared with the general market subjects, farmers have deficiencies in mastering and applying market rules, carrying out professional operation, adapting to market changes and carrying out reform and innovation in time.

(2) the internal governance structure of the collective economy is not perfect. Under the condition of market economy, the collective economy generally shows the inadaptability in the following four aspects: first, there is no distinction between politics and society. Party and government posts and village cooperative management posts have the phenomenon of personnel crossing, financial indifference, village affairs and social affairs mixed up, which seriously deviate from the requirements of modern corporate governance. Secondly, the property right is not clear. The reform of property rights is generally lack of deepening, and resource assets are basically not included in the reform. Thirdly, the management mechanism is not perfect. The operation and management system of village collective assets is not perfect, and the democratic decision-making mechanism, information disclosure mechanism and financial audit mechanism of major issues have not been well implemented. Finally, the powers and responsibilities are not clear. The responsibility and power of cooperative managers are not unified, and there is a lack of mechanisms such as accountability and business incentives.

(3) failure of internal supervision and inadequate external supervision. The general failure of supervision mechanism is mainly reflected in two aspects: one is the failure of internal supervision. Due to the influence of unscientific management mechanism, unclear property rights and the tradition of rural governance in China, internal supervision mechanisms such as information disclosure, democratic supervision and democratic decision-making are generally a mere formality. On the other hand, external supervision is not in place. Although the competent agricultural departments have been confirmed by the system and have administrative power, it is impossible to strengthen supervision by strengthening the administrative power of the government; although the economic and management departments at all levels, as rural collective asset management departments, undertake specific supervision responsibilities, but do not have the corresponding authority for law enforcement, resulting in the decline of management authority and weak management.

(4) the dual system hinders the rural resource assets from entering the market. Under the dual system, the development and utilization of rural resource assets with land as the core is strictly restricted, which makes it difficult for land to achieve efficient and intensive utilization and scientific market management because it is unable to connect other market elements effectively. as a result, farmers can not fully enjoy the land income. Specifically, as far as the operation and management of collective assets is concerned, the value potential of land, as the largest collective asset, has been suppressed by the dual system for a long time. Resource assets such as collective land, especially collective construction land, cannot be mortgaged, guaranteed or invested, and cannot enter the market. This has led to the strange phenomenon of quite a number of collective economic organizations sitting on huge collective land assets on the one hand and operating difficulties on the other, "begging for food in a golden bowl".

(5) departmental interests and fragmentation hinder the discovery of the market value of collective resource assets. From the point of view of the provisions, at present, agriculture, economics and management, gardens and even water affairs are more or less related to the management functions of collective assets, taking the property rights reform as an example, because the assets involved are respectively related to agriculture and forestry departments, although they all belong to collective assets, however, forest rights reform and collective property rights reform should be carried out separately, and the actual operation departments of the two reforms are management departments. From a block point of view, because collective ownership still follows the basic management system of "three-level ownership and team-based" in the period of the people's commune, all assets of collective economic organizations are not allowed to circulate. the economic and management departments of villages and towns are only responsible for the supervision of collective assets within their own townships, so it is impossible to integrate and use collective assets across regions, and unified, standardized and market-oriented supervision is even more difficult to implement.

(6) the poor liquidity of assets and the high proportion of non-performing assets have become chronic diseases. At present, there are some common problems in rural collective assets, such as poor operating efficiency, high proportion of non-performing assets and poor liquidity of assets. It is worth noting that in recent years, in order to avoid abuse and corruption of cadres, villages and towns in various places have strengthened supervision and formulated a very stringent management system for the use of collective funds, resulting in the failure of normal collective reinvestment and, in fact, the death of collective assets. The final result of the joint action of a variety of reasons is the low efficiency of collective assets management.