The Institutional Dilemma of farmland transfer

I. A brief summary and research perspective

From the perspective of the institutional factors affecting the transfer of agricultural land from the perspective of new institutional economics, relevant studies have been carried out mainly from the following aspects: agricultural land property rights, agricultural land legal system, rural social security system, farmers' rational choice. For example, Zhou Rongji (2004) believes that the "alienation phenomenon" (the government strives for profits between the government and the people) caused by the relatively vague collective property rights has given rise to the "principal-agent paradox". Chen Cheng (2005) regards the distortion of land price under fuzzy property rights as the main reason why it is difficult to realize the land market mechanism. In the study of the legal system of agricultural land, Ding Guanliang (2003) believes that the national law to protect the transfer of agricultural land is underdeveloped, which leads to the conflict between the law to guarantee the transfer of agricultural land and the law of national recovery or adjustment in accordance with the law, which reduces the performance of agricultural land transfer. In the aspect of rural social security research, Yao Yang (2000) believes that it is precisely because the current non-agricultural income of Chinese farmers is low, in his analytical framework on agricultural land system, the corresponding function of preserving the value of agricultural land economy improves farmers' ability to resist risks, which leads to the difficulty of agricultural land transfer. Geng Yongzhi (2010) believes that the national rural land system should be incorporated into the elements of the national adjustment of the rural social security system. If the rural social security problem is not solved, it is very difficult for farmers to give up their land. The spontaneous choice and willingness of farmers have also become the focus of many scholars to study the transfer of agricultural land. Zhong Zhangbao, Chen Xiaowu and Wang Xulang (2007) divided farmers into three types in the transfer of agricultural land. it is pointed out that farmers guide their behavior in agricultural land transfer based on their own "limited rationality", hoping to get the most favorable policy arrangements for themselves. Through the field study of land transfer in Z Village in Zhejiang Province, Zhang Letian and Lu Yang (2011) think that the long-formed local order, including community consciousness and human consciousness, affects farmers' behavior choices in land transfer all the time.

Most of the above related studies start with the construction of a single external system related to the agricultural land system, and fully explain the institutional obstacles to the transfer of agricultural land in their respective fields. However, the adjustment of agricultural land system involves many stakeholders (government, collective, farmers, market organizations), and the hindrance of agricultural land transfer system is not an isolated external institutional dilemma, but the result of a series of integrated and multi-level obstacles of external formal system and farmers' subjective informal system. The reason why Coase is regarded as the ancestor of the new institutional economics is that he put forward the foundation of this school-transaction cost. This creative theory solves the different performance of different institutional construction in the environment of positive transaction costs. This paper attempts to take the "institutional dichotomy" from the perspective of new institutional economics as a perspective tool, runs through the full text with the argument principle of transaction costs, and tries to systematically explain the subjective and objective factors of the institutional dilemma. It is hoped that in the further transformation of the farmland system, informal systems such as farmers' subjective "rationality" will be included in the top-level design, so as to achieve the "incentive compatibility" between farmers' wishes and legal texts.

II. Formal institutional dilemma

(1) "plunder" is more effective-the government's unlimited definition of the extension of "public interest"

China is a socialist country under the people's democratic dictatorship. The state form of the people's democratic dictatorship and the rigid ideology of public ownership determine the characteristics of giving priority to collective interests. Land is the mother of wealth. Agricultural land, as the most basic production factor of agricultural production, is of great significance to the maintenance of national food security and even the consolidation of the Party's ruling position. The ideal society of Marxism is to practice the ownership of public land, and agricultural land is no exception. According to the Constitution of China, the urban land is owned by the state, and the rural and suburban land is owned by collectives except for the state regulations. In addition, it is stipulated that the state may expropriate the land of rural collective economic organizations in accordance with the law out of the need of public interest. "dual land ownership" strengthens the asset specificity of land to the state in legal form.

In the discourse system of new institutional economics, the state is naturally limited to constitutional democracy, which is understood as the principal-agent relationship grid between voters as principals and their representatives [1] (P355). Although China does not adopt Western-style democracies such as the Western representative system, the CPC used its own actions to practice the revolutionary promise in the era of revolution and construction so that the masses of the people sincerely granted the CPC to exercise power from the bottom of their hearts. to a certain extent, it is also the relationship pattern that the people entrust-the party acts as the agent. As an integral part of the central government, local governments at all levels can act as principals of rights, deal directly with the masses and act as agents of the masses. The dual role of the local government, which integrates the agent and the principal, has greatly promoted its opportunistic behavior in the process of agricultural land transfer.

After the reform and opening up, the focus of the party's work has shifted to economic construction, no matter from the perspective of the achievements of local government leaders, or from the perspective of promoting local economic development, as a "limited rationality" local government, the pursuit of political achievements has become the demand of economic growth. In the land system arrangement of our country, the local government land and resources department has been granted the actual authority to supervise the land circulation. Based on the contract principle and plunder principle of the state source [1] (P534), there are two ways for the local government to obtain the farmland income.

1. Contract principle: the government is the protector of a series of economic contracts in the society (the farmland transfer contract is no exception). The government uses its own strength and justice to obtain legitimate income. [1] (P534) specifically, the government should facilitate the transfer of contracted management rights of agricultural land, promote the activity of the circulation market, charge reasonable intermediary fees on the basis of realizing the rational allocation of agricultural land resources, and enjoy part of the surplus brought about by the increase in agricultural value after the productive potential of agricultural land is brought into full play. However, transaction costs are everywhere in society, and for local governments, local state organs with seemingly unlimited coercive power are actually helpless in front of the formed system. Strong centralization makes local governments skate on thin ice in the innovation of agricultural land transfer system, and institutional innovation involving agricultural land property rights will take great political risks. The implementation of agricultural land transfer system not only requires local governments to do it themselves, but also the design of a perfect farmland system requires multi-level and multi-departmental coordination and cooperation of political organs, which is expensive for China's state organs, which are rampant with sectionalism. Even if the successful circulation system increases the surplus of the whole society, the local government of rational economic man will face great pressure of public opinion to ask for more surplus as much as possible, which weakens the enthusiasm of local governments to participate in system construction and protection to a certain extent.

two。 After believing in contract theory, the loss seems to outweigh the gain, "predatory government" seems to be "more cost-effective". From the point of view of new institutional economics, in fact, the state, as a "discriminatory monopolist" [2] (P193), will set up different property rights systems from the perspective of maximizing its own interests. Under the arrangement of public farmland property rights, as individual farmers, getting the limited right to use is the greatest welfare. The collective, as an economic subject, does not have the right to buy and sell its own nominal land freely, but can only participate in the interests through the "one-dimensional" upward circulation of land expropriated by the state. Local governments often rely on the narrow channel of agricultural land to enter the market, make use of the strong asset specificity of land, and obtain monopoly transfer fees through the signboard of "public interest". What's more, due to the imperfect market legal system in our country, the behavior of local government can not be substantially restricted. As individual farmers want to realize their legitimate interests through litigation petitions, the cost is huge. In the actual process of agricultural land expropriation, local governments often combine judicial forces to force it, and the wanton simple commercialization of agricultural land obviously saves the government cost than a complete set of system construction.

(2) the underdevelopment of the agricultural land transfer market has led to high transfer costs.

The market is the economic place to realize the optimal allocation of resources. a sound and complete agricultural land transfer market system can fully realize the value of agricultural land, improve the collocation mechanism of agricultural land efficiency, and increase farmers' property income. However, for a long time, China's land system often focuses on the ownership management of agricultural land, and fails to fully realize the economic benefits of agricultural land transfer. The limited agricultural land transfer market led by the national administrative force has not yet formed a real agricultural land transaction price mechanism, which can not fully realize the economic value of agricultural land, and the underdeveloped agricultural land market results in high individual transaction costs.

First, the lag in the development of agricultural land intermediary organizations directly increases the search cost of farmers' information. Agricultural land as a decisive factor of natural endowment, different soil fertility contains huge differences in value. the essential requirement of agricultural land transfer is to maximize the value of agricultural land with different barren capacity. In order to realize the market-oriented transaction of the right to the use of agricultural land and its ancillary rights and interests, both sides of the agricultural land transfer must search for a suitable transaction object. The transferor must spend a lot of money to realize the transfer intention; in order to maximize its own interests, it is necessary to compare the offer information of several potential contractors; after finding a suitable transaction partner, the two sides are based on their own information channels. Bargaining is inevitable. At the same time, due to the asymmetry of regular information between the two sides of the circulation, the inefficient externalities of the circulation have to be passively internalized into the cost.

Second, the role of regulatory government has not changed. As a public factor of production, the Constitution gives the government the complete right of land disposal and supervision. "benefit" from the strong government model under the planned economic system, at this stage, the construction of service-oriented government has a long way to go. On the one hand, the national reform of agricultural land has just started, and the profit-seeking nature of capital in the same period is all focused on the huge cake of agricultural land. At the beginning of the reform, the government's cautious attitude and effective monitoring of agricultural land transfer was a legitimate means to safeguard farmers' rights and national food security; on the other hand, it strengthened the ownership of public land. to a certain extent, it has strengthened the government's monopoly control over land. For the state, urban land belongs to the state unconditionally, and rural land is nominally owned by rural collective economic organizations, but because it holds the key to the transformation of agricultural land, the government actually controls the fate of agricultural land. This is the "North paradox" in the field of agricultural land transfer. Whether the tedious procedures set up by the government in order to monitor the transfer of agricultural land increase the costs of both sides of the transaction, or out of profit-seeking "rationality" to control the agricultural land trading market through institutional arrangements beneficial to itself, have curbed the development and growth of the agricultural land transfer market.

(3) Rural cadres-opportunism of land agents

China's rural areas are grass-roots social organization units developed by farmers on the basis of geography and kinship, and then recognized by the national formal system. Unlike the organs of state power, the villagers' committee, as the leading body at the village level, is elected by all the villagers and is the product of China's direct democracy. The village cadres represented by the village director, as the agents of the voters of the whole village, independently decide the village affairs without state interference (in theory), which plays down the way of electing cadres appointed by the administration. it determines some human feelings in the process of village cadre election. Economically, because the village holds the most important economic resource-land, creating real welfare for the villagers, the foundation of grass-roots mass autonomy can be reflected. But at the same time, China's rural areas are the so-called "local state corporatism" (Oi,1995). Corresponding to the relatively free power of village land disposal, the Party's influence in rural politics is very active [3] (P307). Based on the consideration of the values of collectivism and the pursuit of the concept of governance of common prosperity, the Party has the objective need to sacrifice the interests of the individual in rural areas and give way to the overall interests, and is subject to legal resistance such as mass autonomy. It is a good choice to use village cadres as party members to make up for the lack of government will. Collective economic organizations have relatively independent means of production-agricultural land, labourers in the system-farmers, and village cadres, agents who are influenced by the will of the state and have a certain degree of autonomy. This economic form has the characteristics of state-owned economic organizations to a certain extent. Village cadres, as special agents of farmers and land, naturally have two sets of opportunistic motives:

1. Political opportunism in the "one-way" Transformation of ownership

The state and the collective are the two main bodies of land in our country, and the national law stipulates the implementation measures for the transformation of collective land into state-owned land under certain conditions, although the state can also allocate state-owned land as agricultural land, but this does not change the ownership attribute of state-owned land, and the state retains the right to recover it at any time. This results in an one-way transformation of farmland ownership, that is, it can only be changed from collective ownership to state ownership. In the process of expropriation of agricultural land, the state, as a "rational" collective, always wants the requisitioned agricultural land to obtain agricultural land according to the legal standard price or even low price for the sake of "public interest", while farmers use collective ownership as a threat based on the same reason. with the intention of raising the standard of compensation or even asking for a price. In this game between the government and the people, the identity of village cadres is awkward on both sides. On the one hand, as elected cadres, they should strive for the interests of the people; on the other hand, they are a member of the party organization and have the responsibility to assist higher-level organizations to do a good job in grass-roots work. When local governments encounter difficulties in dealing with agricultural land expropriation, they often use the serious discipline of the ruling party to put pressure on village cadres, and some local governments even link land expropriation with the personal political future of village cadres. At this time, as individual village cadres, they often succumb to the former between the strong organizational pressure and the desired villagers' wishes, because being abused by the people is always more cost-effective than the political opportunities that affect themselves and their families. Village cadres who are supposed to represent the interests of the people often become the vanguard of the government's land expropriation and price reduction, which is too numerous to mention in recent years. Such political opportunism directly depresses the value of agricultural land and farmers' psychological expectations, which in turn reduces the willingness to transfer, which strengthens the difficulty of transfer.

two。 Economic opportunism in the Management of farmland Circulation

In the transfer of agricultural land, whether it is the transfer of agricultural land ownership promoted by the government, or the transfer of contract rights and use rights at the non-governmental level, collective income is the core interests of villagers. On the one hand, the law of our country stipulates that the collective can hold 5% of the collective common cultivated land, and the collective has the right to retain and use the income in the process of non-agricultural conversion of agricultural land. The land income of the village group in the non-agriculturalization of land mainly comes from the retention of land compensation fees and the compensation of public cultivated land contracted without responsibility. In the relationship of rural production and management in our country, the village collective is the actual owner of rural cultivated land and the formal subject of national governance. [4] how to use the income from the transfer of non-agricultural collective agricultural land, the information enjoyed by the broad masses of villagers and village cadres is completely asymmetrical; because the collective direct management of agricultural land has no direct interest relationship with individual farmers, and the majority of farmers have neglected to supervise in advance, it is not uncommon for potential contractors of collective agricultural land to obtain directly managed agricultural land at a low price by means of bribery. Even after the event, due to the weakening of the bottom-up governance function of the village, the cost for farmers to supervise the reasonable and legal disposal of collective land by village cadres is very huge, and the self-interest motivation of village cadres is lack of constraints, which greatly reduces the efficiency of circulation.

III. Informal institutional dilemma

The formal system can only be recognized on a broader social level and can play a full role only when it is compatible with a certain informal system, which is an important point of view of the new institutional economics school. China's market-oriented agricultural land transfer market is still underdeveloped, on the one hand, it comes from the imperfect rigid land transfer system, on the other hand, the informal systems such as the local family order, ideological inertia and "love for land" complex of Chinese farmers also restrict the driving force of agricultural land transfer.

(1) the local order of farmers in the acquaintance society

First of all, from the perspective of grass-roots rural areas, the conclusion that "Chinese society is local" [5] (P1) is still accurate. In the institutional arrangement of agricultural land transfer involving economic egoism, the hypothesis of "economic man" established by western traditional economics has great limitations in the local relations in China's rural areas. Relevant studies have shown that nearly 90% of the agricultural land in contemporary China is transferred between acquaintances, even in the areas where the market mechanism of agricultural land transfer is the best. [6] (P121) this shows that in China's agricultural land transfer market, informal systems such as acquaintance society, rural consanguinity and good-neighborliness play a great role in offsetting the written circulation system and market. Chinese farmers as a single subject of non-governmental agricultural land transfer, because of the relatively vague property rights of agricultural land, the social factors of local neighborhood are often embedded in the pure economic transaction activities involving agricultural land transfer. Many farmland are transferred out of their homes, not simply for the sake of more transfer income, but based on the traditional simple idea of "fertile water does not flow into outsiders' land", transferring relatives and friends, old people, and villagers at low prices. This kind of local order weakens the motivation of both sides to obtain market information, farmland can not realize the maximum potential stimulated by value, and the construction of pure market-oriented transaction mechanism has a long way to go.

Secondly, the local order weakens the spirit of contract. The underdeveloped circulation of agricultural land is not only attributed to the relatively vague setting of property rights, but also lies in the solidification of the local order. The contract is the embodiment of the legal and credit relationship between the members of a modern economy and society. the signing of the contract limits the economic community of a group of people, which is based on the principle of equal status and win-win economy. In western society, consanguinity, geography and rural affection are all filtered in front of the contract, and a contract is a simple economic relationship, while the Chinese folk land transfer agreement is a "situational contract" [7]. The transfer contract full of personification is different from the western contract which follows the strict legal provisions, and it is a highly flexible legal text based on the local order. In this kind of circulation contract, the literally carefully deliberated legal terms imply a set of hidden rules of "acquaintance society" ①. This hidden rule makes the vast number of farmers have an increasing motivation to breach a contract after the transfer of agricultural land, and the villagers, as contractors, generally choose to refund and make peace based on the local order and the feelings of the neighborhood. although institutional arbitration and even litigation can be taken to maintain the integrity of the contract, the immediate economic cost and even the emotional cost of "good-neighborliness" afterwards have to be taken into account. With the social thinking of Chinese acquaintances to interpret the spiritual text of the western contract, it is not surprising that the agricultural land transfer agreement is greatly discounted by the combination of flexible informal system and rigid formal system.

(2) the fetters of ideological inertia on agricultural land transfer

After the extensive land reform after the founding of the people's Republic of China, China's land ownership has realized the transformation from the private ownership of landlords to the private ownership of individual farmers, and then due to the consideration of ideological principles, private land ownership has been recovered through the vigorous agricultural collectivization movement. In the 20 years after the basic completion of agricultural collectivization in 1956, the swift and sudden movement revolutionary education changed the traditional farmers' consciousness of small private ownership. Compulsory ideological education reminds farmers all the time: any individual who vainly tries to own the means of production is petty bourgeoisie and will be overthrown. This highly centralized idea of "returning to the public" has been eroding the small farmers' dream of occupying "one mu and three parts of land" for decades. This cheap "public ownership" ideological supply has a great impact on farmers. [8] (P57) since entering the new period of reform and opening up, this ideological inertia still exists in the hearts of farmers: abiding by this established practice will do no harm to them.

As a rational economic man, small farmers are no less economical than successful entrepreneurs (Schultz, 1987). Relevant studies have shown that even if the state gives farmers full income, transfer and other rights, most farmers still have a lot of scruples about ownership and still regard their farmland, which has a lot of power of decision, as national. [9] this sentiment holds that the state has the right to recover cultivated land at any time, which affects their long-term investment motivation for land fertility. Based on the selfish view that "other people's land is not planted in vain", they are often eager for quick success and quick profit in land development. focus on short-term benefits. This kind of development, which only pays attention to short-term interests and makes every effort to fish the land, has resulted in a decline in the marginal efficiency of the barren land. If you cultivate the land yourself, the output will decrease year by year during the limited contract period, and because of the relatively poor production performance, these lands will not win a good price in the circulation market, affecting the contractor's desire to contract.

In addition, the contradiction between the decrease of land and the increase of population year by year is irreconcilable. The state ensures that the right to contracted management of land will remain unchanged for 30 years in order to stabilize farmers' stable expectations of the right to the use of agricultural land and urge farmers to continue to invest in land to maintain marginal productivity. At the same time, ideology requires that the ruling ideal of the ruling party is to work hard for the welfare of all the people. in order to maintain the fair land rights of the new rural population, the state has given the rural collective appropriate land adjustment power. As a result of this kind of policy contradiction, it is common for farmers to transfer illegally in private, and oral contracts without security are fragile in the face of conflicts of interest.

(3) the dilemma between the "love for earth" complex and the lack of social security

The biggest difference between agriculture and nomadism or industry is that it takes money directly from the land, and this economic activity, which is deeply rooted in the soil, determines the main body of this activity-farmers are glued to the land. [5] (P3) Chinese farmers have a strong attachment to land, and this "love for land" complex determines that most farmers regard cultivated land as the primary use of agricultural land, and have not yet formed to regard agricultural land as a factor of production to exert greater economic value. This simple idea of self-cultivation, on the one hand, is conducive to the protection of cultivated land in our country, so that any act of destroying cultivated land will encounter strong traditional resistance; on the other hand, it also weakens farmers' willingness to scale land and strengthens the difficulty of circulation. Today, the reason why the "love for the land" complex is still strong, in addition to the influence of the traditional thought of small farmers for thousands of years, the lagging rural social security system is the main reason.

Land has three important effects: agricultural production, transmission of profits, and social security. In different stages of social development, farmers rely on the three kinds of utility is not the same. Over the past 30 years of reform and opening up, China's secondary and tertiary industries have developed rapidly, which has replaced the pillar position of agriculture in the national economy, and the proportion of non-agricultural income in farmers' income has gradually increased. The pure productive function of agricultural land tends to weaken, at this time, the social security function of land is prominent. Correspondingly, at the present stage, the supply of rural social security in China is far less than the needs of farmers. Migrant workers, who are also workers and farmers, have no unemployment security, and the procedures for applying for medium and minimum security in rural areas are cumbersome and the security rate is low. as a result, Chinese farmers who are used to heightening their vigilance have to give way to the relatively more urgent social security utility, and farmland is both a "retreat field" and a "life-saving field".

Some scholars believe that the social security function of agricultural land will be weakened with the decline of the comparative efficiency of agriculture in the three major industries and the decline of the proportion of agricultural income in farmers' income. [10] but in fact, it is the weakening of the comparative benefit of agricultural land that makes the security value of agricultural land more and more important, and with the introduction of a series of measures to support agriculture and benefit agriculture in recent years, such as abolishing agricultural tax and raising the minimum purchase price of grain, the decline of the comparative benefit of agricultural production is limited, and the security function of agricultural land is still very important.

For Chinese farmers, it is of great significance to put aside old ideas and increase land income to strengthen their ability to pay for social security, but can they share the sustainable value-added income after transfer? Can we effectively deal with practical problems such as birth, aging, sickness and death? These doubts have strengthened farmers' passive "love for the land" complex. This complex reduces the efficiency of resource allocation of agricultural land and affects the allocation of rural social security funds by the whole society; this low security coverage level strengthens the fragmented management of land, and the realistic dilemma restricts the circulation of agricultural land.

IV. countermeasures and suggestions to get rid of the predicament of the system

(1) strengthen institutional supervision and overcome the "will of the chief" to interfere with the market mechanism

The national nature of the people's democratic dictatorship determines that the perspective of economic decision-making focuses on the fundamental interests of the broad masses of the people from the very beginning. Under the circumstances that the socialist market economic mechanism is not perfect and the socialist legal system is not perfect, it is necessary for political organs to strengthen supervision over land involving the fundamental interests of millions of farmers. However, under the leadership of the party committee, the local government in our country is still a kind of executive responsibility system to some extent, and the top leaders of the party and government still can not get rid of the influence of the traditional one-sided view of political achievements in the decision-making of market economic activities. there is a lack of understanding of the economic benefits of agricultural land transfer, and economic decisions often focus on short-term and immediate benefits. The local government's intervention in the agricultural land market is often accompanied by the explicit or covert "will of the governor". In order to give full play to the market mechanism of agricultural land transfer, the urgent task is to change the performance evaluation mechanism and strictly prohibit the GDP doctrine at the expense of farmers' interests. The organs of political power at higher levels should, within the scope of the law, give grass-roots political organizations the discretion to innovate the forms of agricultural land transfer, and correctly understand the relationship between the party committee, the government and the villagers' autonomous organizations. the party's leadership over the organs of political power and villagers' organizations cannot be in every detail, and the political leadership functions of the party committees should be brought into full play on the basis of fully respecting the laws of the market and defining the boundaries of the party's leadership functions. To improve the feedback mechanism of inner-party democracy, village cadres, as grass-roots mass self-government organizations, should retain the right to reflect the actual farmland of their collective villagers to higher-level party organizations when faced with the deviation between local policies and the actual transfer of agricultural land. we should establish and improve the punishment system of party discipline and state law for acts of expropriation against the wishes of farmers in accordance with the law, and effectively keep power in the cage of the system.

(2) improve the intermediary of agricultural land market and strengthen the construction of rural social security system.

The government should devote itself to establishing efficient rural land transfer intermediary organizations, innovate ways to collect rural land transfer information, simplify transfer procedures, coordinate the allocation of land resources, and reduce the transaction costs of the main body of rural land transfer. establish a scientific land transfer evaluation system to prevent random price increases in rural land transfer. Try to establish a land financing company. For farmers who transfer agricultural land to other subjects who can give full play to their economic use, because of their strong dependence on agricultural land, preferential policies such as low-interest or interest-free loans should be given to encourage them to transfer to other industries. To establish a government-led land agency, entrusted by farmers with weak business will or poor management ability, the government will lease, sublease or transfer to those owners with strong management ability, so as to avoid the desolation of agricultural land and promote the economic potential of agricultural land. The state should constantly improve the rural NCMS and other security systems, and establish a social security system that is mainly raised by farmers' families and supplemented by state and collective security, including social assistance, social insurance and social welfare. its funds come from the state, collectives and individuals, and it can also be considered that the landlord will transfer part of the rent or subcontract fees to pay the social security funds for the transferor, so as to really relieve the farmers from the worries of giving up contracted land. [11] promote the transfer of agricultural labor force and realize the efficient allocation of agricultural land resources.

(3) to guide farmers to change their ideas and form a flexible ideology of market economy

In his important speech at the fifth meeting of the Central leading Group for comprehensively deepening Reform held on September 29, 2014, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "it is necessary to respect the wishes of farmers and adhere to the voluntary and paid transfer of land management rights in accordance with the law. [12] in the practice of the system of agricultural land transfer, we should pay full attention to the ideas of peasant groups, especially in an environment like China, which has thousands of years of agricultural history and tradition, any institutional decision involving agricultural land by the government should include the function of peasant concept. For farmers, at this stage, land is still the only basis for many farmers' survival security and economic welfare, coupled with the love of land complex formed by historical accumulation, they are often reluctant to give up the right to manage land. In view of this, in the practice of agricultural land transfer, we should strengthen the publicity and education of farmers, arm farmers' minds with the concept of modern market economy, change farmers' traditional local concepts, break the traditional consciousness of small farmers, and establish correct land values. In view of the rural and consanguineous Chinese rural society, the establishment of agricultural land transfer mechanism should not only strengthen the design of economic mechanism, but also join the sociological research on the transformation of farmers' psychology, and strengthen the construction of legal system. we will promote the transformation of rural interpersonal network from ethical to legal. Strengthen education, enhance farmers' awareness of the legal system and the market, treat the circulation of agricultural land with a rational attitude, and establish a long-term and effective education mechanism for farmers' ideas.

To sum up, in the future land transfer policy-making process, decision-makers should not only pay attention to the design of formal systems such as clear definition of ownership, convenient transfer system, effective agent supervision, but also focus on informal systems such as farmers' concepts and the cracking of outdated culture. Only the software of informal system can be perfectly matched with the hardware of formal system. The circulation of agricultural land can become a new economic growth point of the whole society.

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