What is hidden behind food subsidies

On August 9, an article entitled "Heilongjiang Grain Chaotic Subsidies Questioned More than a Thousand Rice Factories Forced to Stop Production" reported on the implementation of the policy grain subsidy management measures for rice processing and corn deep processing enterprises in Heilongjiang Province. After a reporter's investigation, it was found that more than half of the enterprises did not meet the subsidy standards. Among the 102 rice processing enterprises included in the subsidy scope, there were as many as 58 enterprises with substandard production capacity, more than half of which went bankrupt or stopped production completely, and 7 enterprises had no processing equipment and had not yet been put into production. (August 9, China Economic Network)

It is reported that on April 15 this year, the Finance Department of Heilongjiang Province, the Grain Bureau and the Agricultural Development Bank jointly issued the Measures for the Administration of Policy Grain Subsidies for Rice Processing and Corn Deep Processing Enterprises in Heilongjiang Province (hereinafter referred to as "Measures"), the document reads: In order to accelerate the development of grain deep processing enterprises in Heilongjiang Province, with the consent of the provincial government, rice and corn deep processing enterprises with annual processing capacity of 100,000 tons or more in the whole province can receive government subsidies of 200 yuan per ton, and grain processing enterprises bidding for rice stored by the state can receive subsidies of 200 yuan per ton. For Heilongjiang, a large grain-producing province, this subsidy can be said to be of great intensity and high standard. If the subsidy is really implemented, the effect on enterprises and farmers will be very significant. It can be found in the reporter's interview survey that this food subsidy is not as we expected, and there are many questions hidden behind it:

First, how is the list of rice processing subsidies determined? The reporter visited the enterprises on the subsidy list, 58 of which did not meet the subsidy standards, accounting for 57% of the total number of subsidized enterprises. Some enterprises had even gone bankrupt, and some enterprises were under construction. I wonder how such a list is determined. Where is the problem? I think the staff of the grain bureau in charge of this work should be very clear. The reporter interviewed the leaders of the county grain bureau and the provincial grain bureau. The county said it was the list directly determined by the province, while the province said it was the list submitted by the county for examination and approval. Who exactly included these enterprises that did not meet the standards in the subsidy list? I hope relevant departments can thoroughly understand the truth of the matter.

Second, where did the subsidy funds flow? After those bankrupt enterprises get these huge subsidies, where will the funds be used? Is there still a certain capital flow and interest chain behind this?

Third, why do eligible enterprises not receive subsidies, but bankrupt, suspended, closed and pending enterprises receive subsidies? The author thinks that there must be violations of discipline and law, if the subjective person in charge is "fault", it may constitute dereliction of duty, dereliction of duty and other crimes; if the subjective person in charge is "intentional", it may constitute corruption, bribery and other crimes.

Fourth, what are the list of corn deep processing subsidies? The report only mentioned the subsidies for rice processing enterprises, but the subsidies for deep processing of corn have not yet been investigated. For Heilongjiang Province, the planting area and grain output of corn should be higher. It is hoped that relevant departments should publicize the list of corn deep processing, so that the subsidies can be truly implemented, so as to achieve the effect of driving the development of enterprises and improving farmers 'income.