The subsidized cases of substandard grain enterprises should be thoroughly investigated.

In recent years, the bumper harvest of grain in successive years is a happy event, but the phenomena of high grain purchase, high inventory, low profit margin and low operating rate of processing enterprises also occur from time to time. In view of this phenomenon, Heilongjiang has issued a special subsidy policy this year, but it has recently caused an uproar in the whole province.

According to reports, on April 15 this year, the document "measures for the Administration of competitive purchase of Policy Grain subsidies for Rice processing and Corn processing Enterprises in Heilongjiang Province" jointly issued by the Heilongjiang Provincial Department of Finance, the Grain Bureau and the Agricultural Development Bank said: in order to promote the development of grain intensive processing enterprises in Heilongjiang Province, with the consent of the provincial government, a single enterprise in the province has a rice and corn deep processing enterprise with an annual processing capacity of 100000 tons or more. A government subsidy of 200 yuan per ton can be obtained, and a subsidy of 200 yuan per ton of rice stored by the state can be granted to grain processing enterprises. However, in just two months after the introduction and implementation of the document, more than 1000 of the province's 1488 large and small rice factories were forced to stop production.

Why is there such a change that is so different from the direction of policy implementation? According to a survey by media reporters, after the implementation of this policy, due to the strength of subsidies, subsidized enterprises have considerable room to reduce prices, resulting in chaos in the whole market. It subsidized 102 enterprises, not counting 58 of them that were unqualified, but more than 1000 rice mills in the province were forced to stop production.

The formation of this confusion has something to do with the hasty process of determining the list of subsidies. According to the survey, the publication of this list is not announced in advance, but issued directly. The list has not been strictly examined by local grain departments, but was directly determined by the provincial government, provincial finance bureau, and provincial grain bureau according to the annual report on processing capacity reported by enterprises. Some enterprises that have stopped production and have no production lines have entered the subsidy list mainly because of their own false reports and lax examination by the local grain bureaus.

The subsidies issued in accordance with the provisions of the document are very powerful for enterprises. A person in charge of an enterprise said that if it is made up by 100000 tons, it is equivalent to 20 million. For an enterprise, it is tantamount to building another production line without a problem. Together with this document, a list of rice processing enterprises enjoying the subsidy policy is issued, involving a total of 102. So how are these subsidized enterprises identified and verified? According to the document, the list is based on the statistical annual report of grain and oil processing industry in 2014 and the monthly report of grain and oil processing enterprises from January to March 2015, which are strictly selected as more reputable rice processing enterprises, with an annual production capacity of more than 100000 tons.

However, there are many questionable aspects in this so-called "strictly screened" list. A survey by media reporters found that among the dozens of processing enterprises included in the scope of subsidies visited, about half of them did not meet the subsidy standards, and only among the 10 enterprises in Hegang City, 4 enterprises went bankrupt or closed down. Not only the bankrupt and closed enterprises have entered the subsidy list, but some grain warehousing enterprises that do not even have production lines have also been included in the subsidy list originally aimed only at processing enterprises. In sharp contrast, many enterprises with qualified processing capacity are not on the list, and the heads of some processing enterprises do not even know that there is such a list of subsidies.

As enterprises included in the scope of subsidies for processing and selling 1 ton of policy rice can receive a government subsidy of 200 yuan, this is equivalent to an extra profit of 0.15 yuan per jin of rice. Under normal circumstances, doing grain business itself can earn 2 points, 3 points means that it is a good deal, 5 cents can be said to be profiteering. As a result, many subsidized enterprises reduce the price of finished products and lead to low-price competition, and many enterprises are "knocked down" by rapidly falling prices before they understand what is going on. This situation is not only unfair to the enterprises that have stopped production, but also has many adverse effects on the market supply.

We hope that the relevant state departments and Heilongjiang Province will conduct a thorough investigation into this incident so as to avoid further adverse effects.